DELHI 2000:OLGA,SEX AND CHINESE SILK

More Than 40 Customs Officers Corrupt

The Swapna Suresh case in Kerala,reminds one of the Olga case in which over 40 officers of the Customs were booked for aiding smuggling in exchange for sexual favours and bribes.

On 28 August 2000, Olga Kozireva, an Uzbek, arrived at Delhi’s Indira Gandhi International Airport from Bishkek by Kyrgyzstan Airlines flight No K2-545.The arrival of a woman from a former Soviet republic was not a rarity, but, Olga stood out. She was 26, fluent in Russian with a little English to get by, and she had a diploma in medicine from the Red Cross Society in Tashkent. Her grainy passport photograph suggested a look that was to become famous a decade later with the release of The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo. And her effrontery at the airport actually seemed to belong in fiction. She had the temerity to walk through the green channel with 27 bags weighing a total of 2,200 kg ( it weighed more than 4000 kg) registered on her air ticket.

In that year alone, between January and August, she had travelled to India 68 times, often with even bigger consignments. But something finally went wrong that day. After four years of letting Olga and several other Uzbek women walk past with little or no scrutiny, a Customs officer decided to act.He was Y Rama Murthy,who caught the 30 kg gold in the UAE diplomatic baggage,in Kerala,later.

Since 1997, Olga and her accomplices had been brazenly walking through the airport’s green channel—for those with nothing to declare—with tonnes of baggage. The day she was caught, the consignment had Chinese silk being flown in from Uzbekistan, a prohibited item that had done great damage to India’s domestic industry. In 2000 alone, there were 23 instances of similar consignments of Chinese silk being cleared with only nominal penalties. Officials on duty, had deliberately noted only small quantities of Chinese silk in their records, charged minor penalties and let huge consignments into the country.

Of the 84 trips she made just through IGI Airport in Delhi since 1997, Customs officials on 42 occasions did not even log a description of the goods she was carrying. On 35 occasions, her flight number was not recorded. During this time that she was flying into India from Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, no one has any idea what she had brought in, apart from Chinese silk. At least one news report at the time states that in October 1999 and June 2000, her accomplices brought in bullet-proof jackets.These were not meant for Indian security forces, so the implications of this are disturbing.

An official involved revealed to Customs investigators that apart from the Uzbek women provided to them for sex, a bribe of roughly $500 was paid on every bag brought in.

On the day she was caught, Olga had 27 bags, and an estimated Rs 5 lakh had been arranged as a bribe to evade Customs duty of around Rs 50 lakh. Taking into account the number of times Olga had visited India since 1997, this roughly adds up to Rs 5 crore in bribes to ensure duty evasion of Rs 50 crore. Considering the fact that she was one among several Uzbek women making similar trips, the racket has meant Customs losses of hundreds of crore in a period when the rupee was worth much more.

The racket began on a modest scale in 1997 when some Indian Group B officers of the rank of superintendent and inspector were first approached. As Olga and her accomplices grew confident of getting material past Customs, the scale of their operation increased to the point that by 2000, Olga herself was walking in through immigration and Customs at IGI airport once every two or three days. The frequency of her visits alone should have triggered an alarm among security officials at immigration, but their failure to act has never been examined.

According to Olga, the man behind the scandal was an Afghan named Mamoor Khan who had left India shortly before her arrest. The arrangement with the officers was simple: even before the consignment was loaded—in Pakistan, Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan—the staff on duty at IGI were contacted, and they in turn would indicate which shift would be appropriate for getting the contraband through.

The network was vast and included staff at some airports where the material was loaded. The investigation found that ‘the staff of [Kyrgyzstan Airlines] at Bishkek and other places were hand in glove with offender passengers to suppress weight of excess baggage carried by them without recording the actual weight of the goods [in lieu] of illegal gratification from the offending passengers.'The airline, which was later fined, informed DRI officials that, ‘this matter has been investigated and [the] services of staff responsible including that of Mr Dusheev, Head of Manas Airport, [have] been suspended.’

In Delhi, as the flight would be about to arrive, traders from Chandni Chowk—a locality in old Delhi—would already have turned up at the airport with delivery trucks to pick up the consignment. They would pay the officials the pre-arranged bribe, and wait for the flight to land. The payment ranged from $400 to $700 a bag, depending on its size. One of the officials later admitted having received sexual favours, too, from Uzbek women.

M K Zutshi

The contraband, usually transported in large sacks, would then be taken out and loaded on the waiting vehicles. None of this could have been possible without the involvement of the senior staff at Customs clearance. The material was not hidden from anyone’s view, nor could it be hauled off surreptitiously. Moreover, in several cases, a nominal weight had been recorded for a much larger consignment, an assessment that could only have been made by the shift in-charge, usually a Group A official of the rank of deputy commissioner or above.

Olga’s arrest had thus exposed an airport smuggling racket unprecedented in its scope and gumption. The financial losses, while large, were not as significant as the possible threat to national security.It was to be expected that investigations would commence speedily, and end in action against the officials involved. But what has followed since is even more incredible.

The passengers - usually women - would alight with loads of baggage, sail through customs and disappear into the bylanes of Paharganj, a congested but flourishing locality adjoining the New Delhi railway station.

It worked smoothly even after the arrest on 28 August, 2000, of Olga Kozireva, the 27-year-old Uzbek who seemed to spend more time in India than in Uzbekistan. The raids on the residences of 48 officials posted at the Indira Gandhi International Airport on March 31, 2001, coincided with the raid on the house of their chief, B.P. Verma. But this exercise should have taken place at least seven months earlier, soon after Olga's arrest.

Apartments in Delhi, Noida and Kolkata. Stray investments worth Rs 40 lakh. Jewellery worth Rs 24 lakh. Loose change of about Rs 3.5 lakh; in many currencies. Few had heard of him before his arrest on 2cApril 2012.

Yet when B.P. Verma, chairman of the Central Board of Excise and Customs and the country's top revenue officer, was taken into custody for graft, criminal conspiracy and possession of assets far in excess of known sources of income, he evoked the voyeur in every Indian who had ever suffered the tyranny of the minor babu.

Verma ran a government agency 80,000-strong. He made a career of transferring people and exploiting discretionary powers.

He also lost his job, and India the taste in its mouth.

Olga, by her own admission, was a frequent visitor since 1997. Often, she would board the flight to Karachi or Lahore in Pakistan on the same day that she arrived in Delhi, and the CBI - the agency investigating the case now - is wondering whether she carried more than just textiles. Says a CBI official: "We cannot rule out the possibility of her carrying drugs or even weapons."

Two different kinds of offences were involved: one related to the criminal conduct of the officials , a case that was handed over to the CBI, and another related to smuggling that dealt with Customs and was investigated by the Department of Revenue Intelligence (DRI).

The problem became clear at the very beginning. The DRI at the time was headed by MK Zutshi, whose wife Vijaya Zutshi was commissioner at the airport till mid-2000. Moreover, DD Ingty, then additional director of the DRI, had been additional commissioner at the airport from 1997 to 1999. This may in some measure explain why the DRI took the otherwise inexplicable decision to restrict its investigation only to the year 2000.

When the case finally did come up before the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), this tribunal began its conclusions and findings by stating, ‘It is shocking to read para 557 of impugned order. Learned Adjudicating Authority noticed that Ms Olga K admitted in her statement that she along with her associates was coming to India right from the year 1997. But show cause notice was issued to different persons to deal with the illegal clearances made mainly [during] the year 2000, even though extended portion was invokable (sic) for a period of 5 years…’

Uzbeks arrested on charges of smuggling fake drugs operated from hotels like Yes Please in Delhi.

B P Verma

Her links in Delhi are also suspect. Inquiries reveal that she was working in tandem with two Afghan nationals who waited outside the airport in trucks to ferry the loot. The CBI now says that there was a three-way nexus between her, the Afghans and the customs officials.

All their cell phones would begin ringing incessantly the moment Olga got off the plane, and records show that they were calling each other on the given dates.
It wasn’t surprising that no Group A officers—that is, officers of the rank of deputy commissioner who supervise shifts and their seniors—serving at the airport were part of the probe.

They were not the only ones kept out; the appellate tribunal in its judgment noted that ‘RN Zutshi (an inspector not related to the then DRI chief whose confession formed the initial basis for the investigation) has deposed unequivocally that 60 per cent of the bribe money used to go to the Preventive Department of the Airport which also manned the exit gates of the Airport. Superfluous investigations were conducted and blame was put entirely on the officers involved in baggage clearance keeping the Preventive Wing completely out of the scope of investigation, making sketchy, superficial, deliberately flawed and incomplete adjudication proposals.’

The appellate tribunal judgment, pronounced in 2011, was the result of an appeal filed against the decision of the airports commissioner who had, based on these ‘sketchy’ DRI investigations, decided to fine seven Customs officials of the rank of superintendent and below. The cumulative fines ranged roughly from Rs 2 lakh to Rs 15 lakh.

The appellate tribunal imposed a fine of Rs 1 lakh each on 14 other Custom officials who had been spared by the commissioner. These officials filed an appeal to the High Court, which sent the matter back to the appellate authority because the case against each had not been dealt with individually but been clubbed together. In what seemed a controversial move, CBI in August 2014 withdrew prosecution against five senior officers of Indian Customs and Central Excise.The five senior officers wre VK Singh Kushwaha, HR Bhima Shankar, Rajiv Gupta, Virender Kumar Choudhary and Upendra Gupta who still held senior positions and have gone on to become Joint Commissioners. 27 other junior Customs officers of Group B and C level, who were also charged by the CBI, were also off the hook.Top CBI officials pointed out that former Finance Secretary RS Gujral has written to then CBI Director AP Singh on 1 March  2012 with the approval of the then Finance Minister, Pranab Mukherjee,asking the agency to apply to the trial judge for a closure of the case against the five top officers. Then AG, GE Vahanvati, gave such a legal opinion as well, CBI said.

The case was repeatedly listed before a bench that did not pass the original order, even though the original bench of DN Panda and Rakesh Kumar continued to sit and he

ar other matters on a regular basis. The Revenue Department, which operates under the Union Finance Ministry, has direct control over the appellate tribunal, but it failed to take any action in this case.

The case was taken over by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in March 2001. This agency asked the Finance Ministry for its sanction to prosecute nine group A officers and 35 Group B and C officers through the Director General (Vigilance). The Ministry finally granted this sanction in March 2006, but only against 27 officers and just five of the nine Group A officers.

The five Group A officers are VK Singh Kushwaha, then additional commissioner at the airport, apart from HR Bhima Shankar, Rajiv Gupta, Virender Kumar Choudhary and Upendra Gupta, who were all deputy commissioners.

After the framing of charges, the actual trial began only in 2011, long after the case had faded from public memory.

In a startling development since, Finance Secretary RS Gujral wrote to CBI Director AP Singh asking the agency to apply to the judge for a closure of the case against the five officers.

The letter stated that the cases were referred to the attorney general, who, after examining the charges and departmental enquiries, recommended the withdrawal: ‘It has been decided by the competent authority that the case [before the special judge, Tis Hazari] is fit for withdrawal of prosecution.’

Departmental inquiries were too closed. Deepak Garg, Deputy Commissioner (Preventive), head of the same preventive wing that came in for so much flak from the appellate authority, became a member of the DRI and was among the select few to join the Tax Research Unit in the Revenue Department, the body responsible for framing the Union Budget.

Agha,Olga's help

Olga Kozireva served a two-year sentence before she was granted bail, which she jumped and made her way back to Uzbekistan. Only one inspector of the department, the one who admitted to sleeping with Uzbek women, was dismissed from service.

The Olga case happened when B P Verma was the head of Central Board of Excise and Customs, now known as Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs – a top policy-making body of the customs department, the officials said.

Verma, it seems, was presiding over a corrupt empire, for the Customs Department even moved the high court to try and scuttle the Olga investigation. Finally, N. Raja, director, vigilance, customs and central excise, had to put down the facts of the case in a letter to CBI Chief K. Raghavan.

The extent to which the customs officials helped Olga is quite brazen. Often, she would just walk out of the green channel, and on rare occasions, pay for part of the goods, when she should have been booked for unauthorised import of textiles. On the day of her arrest-she fell into the net because the shift had changed - the manifested cargo weight was 2,200 kg but on being weighed again it was found to be 4,375 kg.

Verma was later removed as CBEC chief for allegedly receiving illegal gratification from a Chennai-based exporter.

A P Singh

In a blatant attempt to hush up the case, the Customs Department approached the high court after a judge hearing her bail application in the additional sessions court observed that Olga had a dubious link with the customs officials and recommended a CBI investigation.

It sought to expunge the remarks made against them and stall the CBI inquiry. The high court granted the request.

The respite, however, was short lived. The matter came up for discussion in the Rajya Sabha towards the end of November and Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha ordered a two-pronged inquiry: from the vigilance and smuggling angles.

The probe did indeed find the officers guilty of aiding smuggling from the CIS countries and ordered the suspension of 42 of them. It didn’t happen, perhaps because of Verma’s indulgence.

The department was guilty of many more improprieties. An enterprising first secretary, Uma Suryan Arayan Mishra, posted at the Indian Embassy in Tashkent had provided detailed information on how Uzbeks and citizens of other CIS countries made frequent trips to India, carrying items like diamond powder, gold and tungsten wire.

They returned with fake medicines supplied to them at Paharganj hotels. This information was gathered from visa applicants. Records also showed that the Uzbek travellers who were being given six-month multi-entry visas were making as many as 20 trips during the period.

The Olga case was clearly only the tip of the iceberg; eight other Uzbek women were arrested on charges of smuggling and prostitution. They obviously spread their net wide, as according to the CBI, 20-40 young women were coming in on each flight from that region.

Delhi Police conducted raids on Hotel Saini International and subsequently on a banquet hall in Rajinder Nagar – a west Delhi locality-and busted a fake medicine racket. Eight quintals of medicines were recovered with wrappers printed in both Russian and Uzbek.

The medicines, Mishra pointed out, were being sold with Russian markings to pass them off as real but the authorities in Uzbekistan had woken up to the truth. Severe restrictions were imposed at Tashkent airport against import of Indian pharmaceutical products. “These activities should be monitored and controlled before they get out of hand,” the diplomat wrote in May 2000.

The government – the Home Ministry and Intelligence Bureau – too was warned about the Uzbek women, but the letters apparently remained relegated to the files. Copies of the letters from Tashkent were also forwarded to the Customs Department and, predictably, ignored.

In some cases, they were conveniently back dated. A memo sent to V.K. Singh Kushwah, additional commissioner, customs and excise, in February this year-following the internal investigation – points to this.

According to the memo, no circular or alert was issued following the Tashkent letters and worse, the alerts were “fudged” and put out only after Olga’s arrest. Kushwah was also asked to explain his decision regarding the clearing of seven bulletproof jackets brought by another CIS national, Louri Lokhov, on June 10, 2000, which the memo says “is most likely to fall in the hands of antisocial/anti – national elements”.

The scandal also highlighted another serious lapse: the Afghans- Mamoor Khan and Del Agha – are absconding. The CBI is also investigating the possibility of the customs officials having tipped them off about Olga’s arrest.

Afghas Khan

Says a CBI official: “She operated under the belief that she wouldn’t be touched.” Some CIS nationals even stayed for as long as a month at a stretch. Says Vinod Kumar, owner of Hotel Yes Please, a favourite with Olga: “Till her arrest, CIS nationals accounted for 60 per cent of my hotel’s occupancy.”

Hotel rooms in Paharganj come cheap, costing between Rs 150 and Rs 450 a night and are patronised by visiting Uzbeks and other CIS nationals. This corroborates reports from Tashkent that young girls, especially from the fields of entertainment and fashion designing, made as many as 30 trips in six months. This alludes to a well-organised prostitution racket in and around Delhi.

Visa applicants also revealed that they picked up jobs as agents for Herbalife, a brand name that markets food supplements. One of them, claiming to be a Herbalife consultant, had an identity card issued by the company. Photographs of Uzbek women partying and drinking have been recovered during the raids, pointing to the “hospitality” showered by the Uzbeks on the right people.

Questions are being asked about why the Government took eight months to wake up to a scandal that involved national security. Also, why was Raja chosen to head the investigation when he had himself been a commissioner, customs, in 1997 – about the time the CIS operations began?

Similarly, doubts were also raised about the competence of Revenue Intelligence chief M.K. Zutshi participated in the investigations since his wife had been the commissioner at the airport till June 2000.

A P Singh,the CBI Director,who closed the case was arrested by CBI,on 20 February 2017,after he retired,in a graft case along with controversial meat exporter Moin Akhtar Qureshi.Qureshi,according to IT and ED,was operating as middle man for several public servants,including A P Singh.He headed the CBI in 2010-2012,during the UPA government.He was instrumental in the arrest of A Raja of 2G,Suresh Kalmadi of CWG scam.He finalized the Arushi -Hemraj double murder case. Upon his retirement,it was revealed in an IT evasion probe against Qureshi that the two regularly inter acted on daily basis,on Blackberry Messenger platform.Transcripts of conversations from Qureshi's BlackBerry Messenger revealed that not only Singh,former Directors Ranjit Sinha,Alok Verma and and Joint Director Rakesh Asthana had a had a meaty Qureshi angle to their bumpy careers.

"It is revealed that he (Moin Qureshi) has been indulging as a middleman for certain public servants," wrote Karnal Singh, the then ED director, on 31 August, 2016.

The letter annexed full transcripts of messages Qureshi and several other individuals had allegedly exchanged on their BlackBerry Messenger during the UPA era.

Moin Qureshi

"I am also preponing my trip. Just to the homework now. And wait then we will see how to tackle it in the meantime just see who all he listens to," read a message from Qureshi to AP Singh, a former CBI director, on September 24, 2013. "May be AP or K. Nath, or someone else, also any of your friends who know him well," he added.The messages were purportedly intercepted by the Income Tax department and shared by the ED with the CBI.The Enforcement Directorate's warning, however, nowhere established the identity of individuals Qureshi wrote about. But the initials and surnames -- such as "K. Nath" and "AP" -- had a striking resemblance to some of the key figures in the then ruling United Progressive Alliance.

At the same time, the transcripts do indicate the meat trader remained in touch with AP Singh of the CBI for suspect deals in 2013.

In his response, Singh advised Quershi to get in touch with one Shinde. It's not proven whether the former CBI chief was recommending the name of then home minister, Sushil Kumar Shinde, in his reply.

"Ok let me know when you are coming back, you may need to go through Shinde," the ex-CBI director wrote.

© Ramachandran 

MOSSAD AND THE BODY IN DIPLOMATIC BAGGAGE

He Was Smuggled as Diplomatic Baggage

The smuggling of 30 Kgs of gold in an UAE diplomatic baggage in Kerala yesterday,revives memory of the kidnap of a former Nigerian minister from London in a diplomatic baggage.

In July 1984, Umaru Dikko, a former Nigerian minister living in exile after a military coup, was kidnapped outside his London estate, packed in a shipping crate and driven to Stansted Airport, to be flown back to Lagos, where he stood accused of embezzlement and other crimes.

Alhaji Umaru Abdurrahaman Dikko was born on 31December 1936 in the small village of Wamba, close to Zaria in Kaduna State. As a young man Dikko worked for the BBC’s Hausa service. He has been at the vanguard of northern Nigerian politics since the 1960s when, then as a promising young politician he was instrumental in mobilising northern public opinion against Nigeria’s first military government headed by Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, and he was also secretary of the committee of northern politicians that toured the north to build support for the creation of states across the federation in 1966. By the time civilian democratic rule was restored in 1979, Dikko had matured into a wily and experienced politician.

The crate used for kidnap and Dikko

The early 1980s were marked by abundant government corruption. Since there was more money around, the asking price for kickbacks rose correspondingly and the corruption became unashamedly brazen. It was claimed that over $16 billion in oil revenues were lost between 1979 and 1983 during the reign of first elected President Shehu Shagari. Government ministry buildings would mysteriously burst into flames just before audits, making it impossible to discover written evidence of corruption. Shagari later claimed that he pleaded with his ministers to stop embezzling state funds but was simply ignored. Shagari said he simply gave up and prayed over the matter. 

No politician symbolised the graft and avarice under Shagari’s government more than the combative Transport Minister Umaru Dikko. Stories regarding Dikko’s corruption are legion. One such instance arises in the biography of an American contractorJerry Funk who had a contract with the Nigerian government. When the government was not performing its obligations under the contract, Funk took his complaint directly to Dikko. After listening to the contractor’s complaints, Dikko went into an adjacent room and emerged moments later with a suitcase full of money which the contractor estimated at approximately half a million US dollars. Dikko then said words to the effect that if the deal could be done a little “differently” ,life would be easier for both of them. Realising that he would be in Dikko’s pocket forever if he accepted, the contractor wisely refused the offer (Life Is an Excellent Adventure: An Irreverent Personal Odyssey, by Jerry Funk).

Apart from being the Transport Minister, Dikko also headed a notorious presidential task force charged with alleviating food shortages by distributing imported rice. The task force was accused of hoarding rice to artificially exacerbate existing food shortages in order to drive prices up further, and of issuing import licenses to businessmen with connections to the ruling NPN party. Dikko’s name became synonymous with corruption. In many ways Dikko became the 1980s answer to first republic Finance Minister Festus Okotie-Eboh who was similarly disliked by army officers,leading to his assassination during a military coup in 1966.  Dikko perhaps thought himself untouchable because he was President Shagari’s brother-in-law and had the President’s ear. 

Dikko had a way of rubbing people the wrong way. At a time of soaring inflation, scarce commodities and falling oil prices, Dikko’s contribution to a debate about poverty in Nigeria was to remark that things were not so bad, since after all Nigerians were not yet eating out of dustbins. He managed to antagonise even his colleagues in the ruling NPN. The NPN had an elaborate zoning system for the distribution of government portfolios - including the presidency. Since the presidency had been zoned to President Shagari (from the north), the multi-billionaire businessman, Moshood Abiola hoped he would benefit from the NPN’s zoning system. Abiola assumed that when President Shagari’s term of office expired, the NPN would “zone” the presidency to the south, and he would be allowed to run for President. When Abiola articulated his presidential ambition, he was rebuffed by Dikko who told him that “the presidency is not for sale to the highest bidder”. Abiola “retired” from politics soon after – totally exasperated with the NPN. Abiola was to remerge from the shadows to play a key role in Nigeria’s political history.

Shehu Shagari

Dikko made himself unpopular  also with military officers. Dikko knew that if a military coup occurred, he would be a marked man. He kept tabs on senior military officers by ordering covert surveillance on them. Dikko was playing a dangerous game given that the senior echelons of the armed forces officer corps were highly politicised and loaded with officers with significant coup plotting or military regime experience. Among such officers included the Director of Staff Duties and Plans Major-General Ibrahim Babangida, the GOC of the 3 armoured Division,Major-General Muhammadu Buhari, and brigade commander Brigadier Ibrahim Bako. There was political experience among the service chiefs too. Chief of Defence Staff Lt-General Gibson Jalo was a former SMC member, Chief of Army Staff Lt-General Mohammed Wushishi was the former Minister of Trade and Industries and Chief of Naval Staff Akin Aduwo was a former Military Governor. Babangida, Buhari, Jalo, Wushishi and Aduwo all served together under the military regime of General Obasanjo. Buhari complained to President Shagari that Dikko had ordered his movements to be monitored. Dikko had woken a sleeping tiger.

In October 1983 President Shagari was re-elected for his second and final term of office in an election that was marred by accusations of electoral malpractice. His campaign was managed by Dikko. 

Around 2:30 am on New Year's Day 1984, armed troops moved to strategic locations, set up roadblocks and took over the radio and television stations in Lagos. Communication lines were cut and airports, border crossings and ports were closed. In Abuja more troops moved to seal off the President's residence. At 7:00 am, normal programming was interrupted by martial music interspersed with the broadcast by a hitherto unknown army officer.

It was the monotone voice of Brigadier Sani Abacha, the commander of the 9th mechanised brigade in Ikeja.On the last day of 1983, President  Shagari was overthrown in an almost bloodless military coup as the army abandoned the barracks once again in order to “save this nation from imminent collapse”. The only casualty of the coup was Brigadier Ibrahim Bako who was shot while trying to arrest President Shagari in Abuja. The coup was financed by an extremely wealthy southern businessman that Dikko had upset earlier. The new military Head of State was the officer that Dikko had so antagonised earlier: Major-General Muhammadu Buhari. 

The new military regime suspended several parts of the constitution (primarily those relating to freedom of assembly, association and political activity), banned party politics, declared all borders closed, and began to arrest and detain ministers and officials from Shagari’s government on charges of corruption and embezzlement. The new Head of State Major-General Buhari’s first broadcast to the nation made it clear that the new regime would target corruption and corrupt former ministers.

 That placed Dikko squarely in the cross-hairs of the new regime. Armed soldiers went looking for him at his official quarters in Ikoyi, Lagosand ransacked it. Dikko claimed his family, son and elderly family were also harassed by the military authorities. With the assistance of friends and a fistful of raw cash, Dikko drove to Nigeria’s Seme border with the Republic of Benin. Bribing his way through the border he travelled to Togo’s capital Lome, and from there boarded a KLM flight to Londonvia Amsterdam. Contrary to popular belief, Dikko denies fleeing in disguise as a woman, and claims he was dressed in traditional male northern attire.

Muhammadu Buhari

In London Dikko joined a host of other distinguished Nigerian fugitives from justice. They included former ministers in Shagari’s government such as Adisa Akinloye (national chairman of the NPN), Joseph Wayas (former Senate President) and Richard Akinjide (former Attorney-General and Justice Minister).Dikko set himself up as an outspoken critic of the new military regime and launched continual verbal attacks upon it. He appeared on British TV, and granted interviews which condemned the Buhari regime. He quickly became number one name on Nigeria’s most wanted list.

Mossad Steps In

Nigeria supplied more than 50% of Israel’s crude oil in exchange for military hardware. From Israel’s perspective the continuation of the oil flow from a country with a high Muslim population was strategically important. The continuation of that flow was cast into doubt on 1 January 1984 when news of the coup reached Israel, and Israel became aware that Nigeria’s new military regime would be led by another Muslim,Buhari. Israel unsuccessfully tried to make contact with the new military regime.In his book on Mossad entitled Gideon's Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad, Gordon Thomas claimed that Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir was concerned that the new regime might interrupt Israel’s oil supply from Nigeria. Israel saw an opening to gain favour with the new regime when Nigeria began to arrest leading politicians from the former government for corruption. With Dikko still at large and the regime unaware of his whereabouts, Israel offered to track Dikko down using its formidable intelligence agency Mossad.The new Nigerian regime may have solicited Mossad’s intervention. Several senior officers in the Nigerian army had long standing associations with Israeli businessmen and security agents.

Mossad’s Director Nahum Admoni travelled to Nigeria’s then capital Lagoson a Canadian passport to meet with  Buhari.Admoni offered to find Dikko and repatriate him to Nigeria to face justice.Buhari wanted not just physical custody of Dikko, but the location of the offshore accounts where Dikko had deposited the loot he embezzled from Nigeria, an undertaking by Israel to cooperate with Nigeria’s National Security Organisation (NSO), and for Israel to take no credit when Dikko was eventually captured. Admoni agreed and put his formidable resources within Mossad to work.The same modus operandi used in the capture of Adolf Eichmann,one of the major organizers of Holocaust,would be used in the planned capture of Dikko.Mossad put its extensive network of Sayanim to work. The Sayanim are non-Israeli Jews living outside Israel who assist Mossad. 

Info given to the Customs

 Sayanim across Europe were put on alert and memorised Dikko’s image and physical description. Doctors were told to look out in case Dikko came in for plastic surgery to change his appearance. Lookouts were posted at his favourite hotels, and clerks at car rental companies and airlines were on the lookout in case he rented a car or bought a plane ticket. Tailors were given his measurements and shoemakers were given his shoe size and details of his customised shoes. Publishing tycoon Robert Maxwell was tapped and asked to explore his high level contacts for news of Dikko’s whereabouts,according to Gordon Thomas.

Some Mossad agents set up base in London along with Nigerian Major (retired) Mohammed Ahmadu Jarfa Yusufu, a 40 year old former army officer. After the military coup that overthrew Shagari he was transferred to the Nigerian Ministry of External Affairs and posted to Nigeria’s High Commission in the UK in May 1984. Although Yusufu entered the UK on a diplomatic passport, the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office was not notified that he was a member of the Nigerian diplomatic mission.He had been planted for the specific purpose of taking part in the Dikko operation.

Two separate groups of undercover agents worked underground among London’s Nigerian community. The search was narrowed to west London where many Nigerian officials had opulent residences purchased with embezzled Nigerian state funds. The Dikko trail seemed to be running cold until a chance encounter during the summer of 1984. On 30 June 1984 a Mossad agent spotted a man fitting Dikko’s description in London’s wealthy Bayswater neighbourhood. The agent surreptitiously followed Dikko on foot to a house at number 49 Porchester Terrace. For several days the house was continuously watched by the agents, and Dikko’s routine and movements were noted.

The plans for Dikko’s capture were assembled by a small team. It involved making arrangements to capture, anaesthetise, and then transport Dikko out of the UK to Nigeria to face trial. Dr Levi-Arie Shapiro was a 43 year old Israeli national, a consultant and director of the intensive care unit at Hasharon hospital in Tel Aviv. “Lou” Shapiro was also a reserve Major in the Israeli army. Shapiro was recruited into the plot by a 27 year old Mossad field officer named Alexander Barak who gave him money to purchase anaesthetics which would be used to stupefy Dikko. Barak was from the Israeli coastal town of Netanya and came from a family of diamond dealers. Another Mossad field officer named Felix Abithol (31 years old) arrived in London on July 2, 1984 and checked into the Russell Square hotel. Meanwhile Major Yusufu hired a van which would be used to convey Dikko once he had been captured. Strangely, Yusufu’s men opted to hire a bright conspicuous canary yellow van.

Nahum Admoni

On 4 July 1984 a Nigerian Airways Boeing 707 cargo plane flew in with no cargo from Lagos and landed at Stansted airport. The UK authorities were informed that the plane had come in to collect diplomatic baggage from the Nigerian High Commission in London. Several Nigerian security officers were onboard the plane and had orders not to leave the airport.

The next day Major Yusufu drove the van he had rented from Notting Hill Gate in west London and parked outside Dikko’s house on Porchester Terrace. With Yusufu in the van were Dr Shapiro, Barak and Abithol.Back at Stansted airport the Captain of the Nigerian Airways plan that landed the day before filed a departure time of 3pm and claimed that on its way back to Nigeria, the plane would be carrying “documentation” for the Nigerian Ministry of External Affairs. Diplomatic immunity was claimed for the “documentation”.

Just before lunchtime Dikko emerged from the house in Porchester Terrace for a midday interview with a Ghanaian journalist named Elizabeth Akua Ohene. Ohene was then the editor of Talking Drum magazine but later became a Minister of State in Ghana’s Ministry of Education. As Dikko walked, two men burst out from the yellow van parked outside his house, grabbed him and forced him into the back of the van. Within seconds the van doors had closed and the van sped away at break-neck speed. Quick, surgical and precise, it was a typical Mossad operation. Inside the van Dikko was dumped on his back and handcuffed. After traversing through London’s busy streets the van eventually came to a halt. Dikko was initially relieved and thought his kidnappers had been stopped by the police.They had simply stopped to refuel. Dikko was told to keep quiet as his captors refuelled. At a predetermined rendezvous point near Regent’s Park, Dikko was transferred to a waiting lorry. Dr Shapiro went to work and injected Dikko in the arm and buttock with a powerful anaesthetic. Dikko lost consciousness.

Dikko,final years

Through a window Dikko’s secretary Elizabeth Hayes witnessed Dikko being bundled into the van. The astonished secretary managed to compose herself enough to quickly dial 999,the UK’s emergency services number, and alerted the authorities of the incredible incident she just witnessed. Given Dikko’s profile as a former Nigerian government minister, the call was quickly escalated and within minutes police arrived at the scene, closely followed by officers from Scotland Yard’s anti-terrorist squad. The Foreign Office and the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher were also alerted. All customs officials at airports, ports and border crossings were told to be extra vigilant with regard to Nigeria bound vessels.

There was a second hitch. When subsequently interviewed by Israel’s biggest selling newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth, Alexander Barak said "In retrospect, I found out that the main culprit had been Group Captain Banfa, formerly head of the Nigerian air force and now CEO of Air Nigeria. This guy was supposed, according to the plan, to meet at 9:00 am with Yusufu and Dr. Shapiro at the apartment in London and give them the right documents and join us, to supervise the loading of the diplomatic crates at Stanstead Airport. But at the last minute Banfa got cold feet." The absence of the correct diplomatic documents would come back to haunt the kidnappers.

By mid-afternoon on 5 July 1984 Dikko had been anaesthetised into unconsciousness by Dr Shapiro, locked into a crate and taken to Stansted airport. However at Stansted there was no visible sign of Dikko, Shapiro, Abithol or Barak. Instead a lorry ferried two crates to the airport. The lorry was escorted by two black Mercedes Benz cars bearing Nigerian diplomatic licence plates. Shortly before 3 pm two crates labelled "diplomatic baggage" and addressed to the Nigerian Ministry of External Affairs in Lagos were being loaded onto the Nigerian Airways plane. The crates were 1.2 meters in height, 1.2 meters in depth and 1.5 meters in width. They were accompanied by Major Yusufu and a member of the Nigerian High Commission in London named Okon Edet. Having been warned by the security forces to be wary, customs officers were unusually inquisitive and vigilant.

Elizabeth Akua Ohene

A customs officer named Charles Morrow noticed an unusual medical smell,probably the powerful medical anaesthetic sodium pentathol,and a noise emanating from one of the crates. Although the 707 was minutes away from take off, this gave Morrow an excuse to use red tape to get a closer look at the crates. On the pretext that the crates did not have the correct official seal, Morrow insisted on having a closer look at them. Major Yusufu protested furiously that the crates were protected by diplomatic immunity and could not be searched. His vehement protests were dismissed and the customs officers opened the crates with a crowbar.

 In the first case was a bound and unconscious Dikko with his torso bare. Dikko’s captors had shoved an endo-tracheal tube in his throat to prevent him from choking on his own vomit when he was out cold, but he was still alive. They wanted him brought to Nigeria alive rather than dead. Beside him was Dr Shapiro brandishing syringes and a supply of additional anaesthetics with which to administer replenishments to Dikko. Dr Shapiro asked the customs officers “Well gentlemen, what do we do now?”. Abithol and Barak were found in the second crate. Dikko was rushed to Hertfordshire and Essex Hospital in Bishops Stortford. He regained consciousness at midday the following day having been unconscious for 36 hours. He awoke totally oblivious to the ensuing drama and his dramatic rescue, and received treatment at the hospital under heavy police guard. Barak later blamed Nigerian air force officer Bernard Banfa for the plan’s failure.

The governments of Nigeria and Israel denied involvement in the crime. Immediately after the abduction, Britain detained airliners bound for Nigeria and vice versa, and relations between Britain and Nigeria, its former colony, were seriously chilled.

Of the original 17 suspects, 4 were tried:Barak, Shapiro, Abithol and Yusufu. The legendary defence barrister George Carman QC represented the defendants. Sticking to the traditional Mossad response of denying involvement, the defendants argued that they were mercenaries acting on behalf of Nigerian businessmen. The judge did not believe them and was convinced that Mossad was involved. The judge told the jury that “The finger of involvement almost certainly points to Mossad”. Even Carman’s famed legal skills could not prevent the defendants’ conviction:

Alexander Barak - 14 years
Mohammed Yusufu – 12 years
Levi-Arie Shapiro - 10 years
Felix Abithol – 10 years

After recovering, Dikko remained in London for another 12 years. He was confined at home under police guard for a year. In exile he fulfilled a childhood ambition by qualifying as a barrister. Dikko was eventually invited back to Nigeria in 1995 by the military regime of General Sani Abacha,who was a member of the government which tried to kidnap and forcefully repatriate him in 1984. On his return he formed a political party called the United Democratic Party (UDP).Dikko died on 1 July 2014 in London, where he was said to be receiving treatment for an undisclosed illness. 

Dikko’s survivors include a son, Dr. Bello Dikko, and a brother, Lamido Dikko. The Daily Independent of Lagos had said in its obituary that Dikko “left behind two wives, 11 children and many grandchildren.”

© Ramachandran 

HOW NEHRU AND MENON LET DOWN INDIA IN 1962

Menon Humiliated the Army Chief Thimayya

The Sino-Indian Treaty on Relations between India and the Tibet Region of China was signed in 1954. India gave up its rights in Tibet without seeking a quid pro quo. The Panch Sheel was enunciated,which Jawaharlal Nehru presumed presupposed inviolate boundaries in an era of Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai.

The young Dalai Lama ( then 26) came to India in 1956 to participate in the 2500th anniversary celebrations commemorating the Enlightenment of the Buddha but was reluctant to return home as he felt China had reneged from its promise of Tibetan autonomy. Chou En-lai visited India later that year and sought Nehru’s good offices to persuade the Dalai Lama to return to Lhasa on the assurance of implementation of the 17 Point Agreement by China in good faith.

Visiting China in 1954, Nehru drew Chou En-lai’s attention to the new political map of India which defined the McMahon Line and the J&K Johnson Line as firm borders (and not in dotted lines or vague colour wash as previously depicted) and expressed concern over corresponding Chinese maps that he found erroneous. Chou En-lai replied that the Chinese had not yet found time to correct its old maps but that this would be done “when the time is ripe”. Nehru assumed this implied tacit Chinese acceptance of India’s map alignments but referred to the same matter once again during Chou’s 1956 visit to India.

The Aksai Chin road had been constructed by China by 1956-57 but only came to notice in 1958 when somebody saw it depicted on a small map in a Chinese magazine. India protested. The very first note in the Sino-Indian White Papers, published later, declared Aksai Chin to be “indisputably” Indian territory ” and, thereafter, incredibly lamented the fact that Chinese personnel had wilfully trespassed into that area “without proper visas”.The misguided Nehru was even at that time prepared to be flexible and negotiate a peaceful settlement or an appropriate adjustment. Parliament and the public were, however, kept in the dark.

Menon and Nehru

Nehru had begun to reassess his position.The late G. Parthasarathi met Nehru on the evening of 18 March 1958, after all concerned had briefed him prior to his departure for Peking as the new Indian Ambassador to China. GP recorded what Nehru said:

“So G.P. what has the Foreign Office told you? Hindi-Chini bhai bhai? Don’t you believe it! I don’t trust the Chinese one bit. They are a deceitful opinionated, arrogant and hegemonistic lot. Eternal vigilance should be your watch word. You should send all your Ttelegrams only to me – not to the Foreign Office. Also, do not mention a word of this instruction of mine to Krishna ( Menon). He, you and I all share a common world view and ideological approach. However, Krishna believes – erroneously – that no Communist country can have bad relations with any Non-Aligned country like ours”.

Chinese incursions and incidents at Longju and Khizemane in Arunachal and the Kongka Pass, Galwan and Chip Chap Valleys in Ladakh followed through 1959. The Times of India broke many of these early stories.Vague whispers of “some trouble” further east were heard.On the way to Chushul, the air strip was still open,and beyond to the Pangong Lake unimpeded.

The Khampa rebellion in Tibet had erupted and the Dalai Lama fled to India in 1959 via Tawang where he received an emotional welcome. The Government of India granted him asylum along with his entourage and over 100,000 refugees that followed and he took up residence with his government-in-exile in Dharamsala. These events  disturbed the Chinese and marked a turning point in Sino-Indian relations. Their suspicions about India’s intentions were not improved by Delhi’s connivance in facilitating CIA-trained Tibetan refugee guerrillas to operate in Tibet and further permitting an American listening facility to be planted on the heights of Nanda Devi to monitor Chinese signals in Tibet.

China had by now commenced its westward cartographic-cum-military creep in Ladakh and southward creep in Arunachal.

The highly respected Chief of Army Staff, Gen.K.S. Thimayya began to envisage a new defence posture vis-à-vis China in terms of plans, training, logistics and equipment.Krishna Menon, aided by B.N. Mullick, the IB Chief , who also was close to Nehru, disagreed with this threat perception and insisted that attention should remain focussed on Pakistan and the “anti-Imperialist forces”. Growing interference by Krishna Menon, now Defence Minister, in Army postings and promotions and strategic perspectives so frustrated Thimayya that he tendered his resignation to Nehru in 1959. Fearing a major crisis, the PM persuaded Thimayya to withdraw his resignation, which he unfortunately did at the cost of his authority. Nothing changed. Mullick and Menon sowed in Nehru’s mind the notion that a powerful Chief might stage a coup (as Ayub had done). This myth was for long a factor in Government’s aversion to the idea of appointing a Chief of Defence Staff.

A coup had taken place the previous year in October 1958 in neighbouring Pakistan, and there was loose talk in the cocktail party circuit of whether India’s turn would be next. A naturally paranoid defence minister would have found all this sinister, even though the Times of India of 4 January 1959 carried this report:

No Possibility of Military ‘Coup’ in India

Ruling out the possibility of a military ‘coup’ in India, Mr. V.K. Krishna Menon, Defence Minister, said here today that ‘whosoever attempted such a thing would come to grief . . .’ Mr. Menon said:

"We have a strong parliamentary system of Government. Our soldiers are well educated and disciplined. They do not meddle in politics.’ ‘In fact’, Mr. Menon added, ‘it is silly to think in terms of a military dictatorship’. ‘The people’, he said, ‘were conscious of their democratic rights and the prevailing social conditions widely varied from what led to military regime in other countries . . ."

Mountbatten had been pressing both Nehru and Krishna Menon to appoint a chief of defence staff (CDS) who would have overarching authority over the army, navy and air force, and had been suggesting Thimayya’s name for this post. Krishna Menon resented this lobbying and, in any case, was dead set against the idea of a CDS, thinking that it would give too much importance in policy to a single military man.

It was with pain and anguish  Gen Thimayya described to other senior officers, the relations of the Army HQs with the Defense Ministry; mainly his with the Defense Minister, VK Krishna Menon.

No wonder the Indian Army got the thrashing of its life from the Chinese, just three years later in 1962. And within two years of that Nehru died a broken and ravaged man. Here is how the story of General Thimayya’s resignation:

Menon called Thimayya and told him that he had no business to meet the Prime Minister without his specific approval. Thimayya reiterated that the Prime Minister desired to know about the preparedness and the state of morale of the Army and he had told him nothing that he had, over the period of 18 months or so, not discussed with the Minister.

Menon remained furious and said: “No, General. It’s downright disloyalty and amounts to impropriety.”

To this, Thimayya replied,: “I make no allegations. You can call the other Chiefs too. They will say the same that they and I have continuously said — that the Services are being neglected and that their morale is low. These are the facts that we have told you earlier and I told the Prime Minister now. I am reiterating that by speaking candidly I and other Chiefs are being loyal to you, the Government and to the Country. That’s what loyalty means to me.”

After another outburst from Menon, Thimayya saw no further point in carrying on the conversation. Deeply hurt at the Minister’s remarks, he got up and repeated: “I have never been disloyal to anyone, least of all to you, my country or the government.”

Menon shouted at the top of his voice. “You are disloyal to me and I have no place for disloyal generals”. 

After Thimaya  left, Menon met Nehru, who asked him not to rock the boat. He assured him that he would once again get the chiefs’ willing co-operation, provided Menon showed patience.

It was late when Thimayya reached home and told his wife, Nina to be ready to pack up and then murmured, “It’s time to pack up honorably.” He also talked to the other Chiefs, Air Chief Marshal Mukherjee and Admiral Katari and told them he was seriously contemplating putting in his papers the next day. Both repeated their vow to ‘follow him.

General Thimayya

Thimayya drafted his resignation letter the following morning and showed it to Mukherjee and Katari, both of whom confirmed their willingness to follow suit. “My conscience says wait” was Nina’ s advice.

Thimaya called Major General S.P.P. Thorat, his preferred successor, who advised the same. So was the suggestion of Bogey Sen, his CGS and Wadalia, his Deputy Chief. General Cariappa who was in Delhi asked him to meet the prime minister again before he ‘bunged in’ his letter.

That night, Thimayya thought and re-thought about throwing away a fine career, the great honor the country had bestowed upon him and the trust his officers and men had reposed in him. It was one of the saddest nights of his life. In the morning Thimaya sent his letter to Nehru..

Nehru called Thimayya and put his arm around his shoulder and asked him why he hadn’t met him earlier, rather than sending in his resignation. “Please withdraw it straight away,” ordered a visibly annoyed Prime Minister. “I will see you again at 7 pm with your letter withdrawing your resignation. In the meanwhile, I am keeping your letter with me.” He then asked him to return at 7 pm.

Katari had informed Mukherjee, who was by now in London, that Thimayya had submitted his resignation and he was following suit. The period between 2.30 pm and 7 pm was used by Nehru to control the damage which the resignation of the chiefs would cause to the government, the services’ morale, and result in the joy of the enemy.

Nehru rang up Katari and told him that he had called Thimayya and he was withdrawing his resignation and he should not entertain any such proposal. (A similar message went to Mukherjee through the High Commission.) He told him that Thimayya would meet him again in the evening and he should meet him at 9.30 pm.

By the time Thimaya arrived at the Teen Murti residence of the prime minister at 7 pm through a carefully orchestrated game play, Nehru had distanced the other chiefs from Thimayya by talking them out of it. Menon too was asked to keep a draft of his resignation handy. An emergency meeting of the Cabinet Committee was also called.

When they met, Nehru began his effort to win over Timayya.Thimayya said that he had not changed his mind and instead urged the prime minister to accept his resignation. In his defense, he argued: “That’s the only honorable course left to me and the other chiefs. When professional advice and recommendations are flouted at the drop of a hat, the chief loses his place and importance.”

Nehru said: “We have sufficient problems. And at this moment of crisis, one should not do anything to encourage opponents and the enemy. Shouldn’t it be so, Timmy?"

Thimayya explained that it was indeed a “moment of crisis” and it was his loyalty to him and his sense of patriotism to the country that had moved him to sacrifice his job. He repeated that Menon as defense minister had “made it impossible” for him and the other chiefs to work as head of the services, and unless Menon was moved out of defense, there could be little progress. But he understood that as this obviously could not be agreed to by the prime minister, he — and the other chiefs — should step aside, and, therefore the submission of his resignation.

Nehru admitted that Menon was a “difficult man”, but he was simply “brilliant” and was doing service to defence which no one earlier had done. Thimaya agreed, but suggested that his methods of “man-management” were “outrageous” and his brilliance was that of an “Oxford professor of philosophy” rather than of a man dealing with the country’s defense forces which have to be prepared and motivated to fight enemies.

Finally, he told his prime minister: “With the present state of the army, I can hardly assure success. We are not prepared. All my efforts — as also of others — have failed for the past 24 to 30 months to make the armed forces a viable defense force. So let someone else do the job – I request my resignation be kindly accepted.”

Nehru then pleaded with Thimayya: “Timmy, I ask you to withdraw this resignation. I, as your elder and not necessarily your Prime Minister, am requesting you to do s o. I promise to restore dignity to you and the other Chief’s Offices. We have to fight an enemy. For my sake, withdraw it.”

At 9.30 pm Katari met Nehru who told him that they were “ganging up” against Menon and that “Thimayya had withdrawn his resignation” — both factually wrong. Katari, then decided to call off handing his letter of resignation without even checking with Thimayya.

Enormous damage was done to the Chiefs’ solid standing.

On the morning of 1 September, the Capital awoke alarmed to the disturbing disclosures in the Statesman about Thimayyas’ resignation (which had, by then, been withdrawn). J N Chaudhuri,a top army officer,who was the daily's confidential military commentator, had passed on the information.Chaudhuri would become Chief of the Army in November 1962.Chaudhuri would later admit in his autobiography to being the military correspondent of the Statesman from 1951 for a decade and confess that his ‘anonymity was very well kept’.

There was also considerable applause when the prime minister assured the House — and through it, the country — that “under our practice, the civil authority is, and must remain supreme” (while it should, however, pay due heed to expert advice). There was also applause when he referred to the army’s “fine mettle” and “excellent morale.”

It was (daughter) Mireille who wept bitterly at the public humiliation of her father in Parliament (where she sat alongside Indira Gandhi) by Pandit Nehru; tears welled up in her eyes. When she recalled the scene to her father, the tears returned.

She spoke of these things to her father on the telephone at Secunderabad where he had gone for the forth coming inauguration of the Joint Land Warfare School. “Daddy, you have been let down. Mummy was right in asking you not to withdraw your letter.”

Thimayya said nothing.

On his return to Delhi, he showed her the office copy of his letter of resignation that contained the gist of what had transpired between him and Nehru – besides the appeals from the prime minister to withdraw his letter.

“You’ll now on defend your father, I hope,” he said. 

“Always passionately, Daddy,” replied Mireille.

“If these are trivial, then I know of no other important issues,” he told Nina, who was furious at the withdrawal and asked him to “re-resign” without a second thought, and expose the duo.

He told her that he had accepted the advice and the assurances of his Prime Minister and had withdrawn his resignation.“For, in a democracy, a resignation is the only constitutional safeguard to a service chief against incompetent, unscrupulous or ambitious politicians” .

A month after the Thimayya resignation episode, the UK high commissioner in India, Malcolm Macdonald, met General Thimayya on 6 October 1959 and sent back a report of their long conversation, which was largely on the India–China border question. Towards the end, the topic of the minister of defence came up and Macdonald wrote:

"General Thimayya said one of the great difficulties in all this business had been Mr. Krishna Menon’s zeal in representing the Pakistanis as the true enemies of India. Mr. Menon played up and often publicized as extremely unfriendly every small frontier trouble between the Pakistanis and Indians, invariably blaming the Pakistanis. The General did not know why the Minister did this. Perhaps it was because Mr. Menon wished to strengthen the case he had made (with popular effect for himself in India) against Pakistan over the Kashmir issue. Anyway, whatever the reason, the Minister of Defence insisted that India’s armed forces should be disposed on the assumption that an attack on India would be launched from Pakistan."

That Thimayya opened up to Macdonald was highly unusual as, after all, the latter was the UK high commissioner, and the top army man was telling him every detail of what he had said to his Prime Minister and defence minister.

On his father's side, Thimayya belonged to the Kodendera clan of Kodagu to which India's first commander-in-chief General Cariappa also belonged (his uncle in fact).

General Thimayya had recommended Gen Thorat to succeed him as Gen Thorat had carried out a thorough recce and submitted a plan to Timmy in case of a war with China.

This was that since NO Roads had been made in the forward areas despite the urgings of Sardar Vallabhai Patel since 1950 and others thereafter, a classic Defensive Battle should be fought at the existing road heads so as to blunt the Chinese Offensive as then that would be from an extended advance over nebulous foot paths.

This recommendation was shelved and Gen Thapar was made Chief as a stop gap till Gen Kaul took over.

B M Kaul

President Ayub Khan of Pakistan had on a brief stopover meeting with Nehru in Delhi en route to Dhaka in 1959 had proposed “joint defence”. Joint defence against whom, was Nehru’s scornful and unthinking retort. Nehru was not unconscious of a potential threat from the north as he had from the early 1950s repeatedly told Parliament that the Himalayan rampart was India’s defence and defence line. He had somewhat grandiloquently and tactlessly proclaimed that though Nepal was indeed a sovereign nation, when it came to India’s security, India’s defence lay along the Kingdom’s northern border, Nepal’s independence notwithstanding! He had been remarkably lax in preparing to defend that not-quite-so-impenetrable a rampart  or even countenance his own military from doing so.

Almost a decade later, Himalayan border road construction commenced under the Border Roads Organisation and forward positions were established. This Forward Policy, though opposed by Lt Gen.Daulat Singh, GOC-in-C Western Command, was pushed by Krishna Menon,de facto Foreign Minister, and equally by B.N Mullick, who played a determining role in these events, being present in all inner councils.

Many of the 43 new posts established in Ladakh were penny packets with little capability and support or military significance. The objective appeared more political, in fulfilment of an utterly fatuous slogan Nehru kept uttering in Parliament and elsewhere, that “not an inch of territory” would be left undefended though he had earlier played down the Aksai Chin incursion as located in a cold, unpopulated, elevated desert “where not a blade of grass grows”. In August Nehru announced that Indian forces had regained 2500 square miles of the 12,000 square miles occupied by the Chinese in Ladakh.

Backseat driving of defence policy continued to the end of Thimayya’s tenure when General P.N.Thapar was appointed COAS in preference to Thimayya’s choice of Lt. Gen S.P.P Thorat, Eastern Army Commander. Thorat had produced a paper in the prevailing circumstances advocating that while the Himalayan heights might be prepared as a trip-wire defence, NEFA should essentially be defended lower down at its waistwhich, among other things, would ease the Indian Army’s logistical and acclimatisation problems and correspondingly aggravate those of the Chinese. The Thorat plan, “The China Threat and How to Meet It”, got short shrift.

The Goa operation at the end of 1960 witnessed two strange events. The new Chief of General Staff (CGS), Lt. Gen. Brij Mohan Kaul marched alongside one of the columns of the 17th Division under Gen Kunhiraman Palat Candeth,( a Keralite like Menon), that was tasked to enter Goa. Thereafter he and, separately, the Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, declared “war” or the commencement of operations at two different times: one at midnight and the other at first light the next morning. In any other situation such flamboyant showmanship could have been disastrous.Goa was a cake walk and evoked the mistaken impression among gifted amateurs in high places that an unprepared Indian Army could take on China.

Kaul’s promotion to the rank of Lt. Gen and then to key post of CGS had stirred controversy,since he was a relative of Nehru. He was politically well connected and had held staff and PR appointments but was without command experience. The top brass was divided and the air thick with intrigue and suspicion. Kaul had inquiries made into the conduct of senior colleagues like Thorat, S.D Verma and then Maj.Gen. Sam Manekshaw, Commandant of the Staff College in Wellington.

Even as the exchange of Sino-Indian notes continued, Nehru on 12  October 1962 said he had ordered the Indian Army “to throw the Chinese out”, something casually revealed to the media at Palam airport before departing on a visit to Colombo.

A new 4 Corps was created on 8 October 1962 with headquarters at Tezpur to reinforce the defence of the Northeast. Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh was named GOC but was soon moved to take over 33 Corps at Siliguri and then moved again to the Western Command. Kaul took charge of 4 Corps but appeared to have assumed a superior jurisdiction because of his direct political line to Delhi. Command controversies were further compounded as at times it seemed that both everybody and nobody was in charge. Thapar himself and Gen L.P. Sen,  at Eastern Command, also went to recce and reorder defence plans along the Bomdila-Se La sector. At the political level and at the External Affairs Ministry the adage was “Panditji knows best”.

Kaul was here, there and everywhere, exposing himself in high altitudes without acclimatisation.He fell ill and was evacuated to Delhi on 18 October only to return five days later.

Following Nehru’s “throw them out” order, and against saner military advice and an assessment of ground realities, a Brigade under John Dalvi was positioned on the Namka Chu River below the Thagla Ridge that the Chinese claimed lay even beyond the McMohan Line. It was a self -made trap. It was but to do or die. The Brigade retreated in disorder after a gallant action, while the Chinese rolled down to Tawang which they reached on 25 October.

The Economist parodied Rudyard Kipling. A text of a pithy editorial titled “Plain Tales from the Hills” read, “When the fog cleared, The Chinese were there”.

A new defence line was hurriedly established at Se La. Nehru was by now convinced that the Chinese were determined to sweep down to the plains. The national mood was one despondency, anger, foreboding. The Times of India editor, N.J.Nanporia, who sadly just passed away a few weeks ago, got it right.

In an edit page article he argued that the Chinese favoured negotiation and a peaceful settlement, not invasion, and India must talk. At worst the Chinese would teach India a lesson and go back. Critics scoffed at Nanporia. A week or 10 days later, in response to his critics, he
reprinted the very same article down to the last comma and full-stop. Events proved him absolutely right.

On 24 October, Chou En-lai proposed a 20 kilometre withdrawal by either side. Three days later Nehru sought the enlargement of this buffer to 40-60 km. On 4 November, Chou offered to accept the McMahon Line provided India accepted the Macdonald Line in Ladakh approximating the Chinese claim line (giving up the more northerly Johnson Line favoured by Delhi).

The Army arranged for the press to visit the NEFA front. On 15-17 November 15-17 all drove up to Se La (15,000 feet) and down to Dirang Dzong in the valley beyond before the climb to Bomdila.

Reporters saw Jawans in cottons and perhaps a light sweater and canvas shoes were manhandling ancient 25-pounders into position at various vantage points.They had seen and heard Brij Mohan Kaul’s theatrics and bravado at 4 Corps Headquarters a day earlier and were shocked to see the reality: ill-equipped, unprepared but cheerful officers and men digging in to hold back the enemy under the command of a very gallant officer, Brig Hoshiar Singh.

Dalai Lama,Nehru,Zhou En Lai

The press had barely returned to Tezpur on 17 November,when they learnt that the Chinese had mounted an attack on Se La and outflanked it as well. 

Even as battle was joined, Kaul, disappeared from Tezpur to be with his men, throwing the chain of command into disarray. The saving grace was the valiant action fought at Walong in the Lohit Valley. Much gallantry was also displayed in Ladakh against heavy odds.

The use of the air force had been considered. Some thought that the IAF had the edge as its aircraft would be operating with full loads from low altitude air strips in Assam unlike the Chinese operating from the Tibetan plateau at base altitudes of 11,000-12,000 feet.The decision was to avoid use of offensive air power to prevent escalation.

On 18 November, word came that the Chinese had enveloped Se La, which
finally fell without much of a fight in view of conflicting orders. A day later the enemy had broken through to Foothills along the Kameng axis. Confusion reigned supreme. Kaul or somebody ordered the 4th Corps to pull back to Gauwahati on 19 November and, as military convoys streamed west, somebody else ordered that Tezpur and the North Bank be evacuated.

A “scorched earth” policy was ordered by somebody else again and the Nunmati refinery was all but blown up. The DM deserted his post. Rana KDN Singh, was directed to take charge of a tottering administration. He supervised the Joint Steamer Companies, mostly manned by East Pakistan lascars, as they ferried a frightened and abandoned civil population to the South Bank. The other modes of exodus were by bus and truck, car, cart, cycle and on foot. The last ferry crossing was made at 6 pm. Those who remained or reached the jetty late, melted into the tea gardens and forest.

The Indian Press had ingloriously departed the previous day, preferring safety to real news coverage, – as happened again in Kashmir in 1990, when at least women journalists subsequently redeemed the profession. Alongwith the two Indians remained in Tezpur, wandering around like lost souls, were some 10-15 patients who had been released from the local mental hospital.

Tezpur was a ghost town. The State Bank had burned its currency chest and a few charred notes kept blowing in the wind as curious mental patients kept prodding the dying embers. Some stray dogs and alley cats were the only other companions.

Around midnight, a transistor  crackled to life as Peking Radio announced a unilateral ceasefire and pull back to the pre-October “line of actual control”, provided the Indian Army did not move forward. 

Next morning, all the world carried the news, but AIR still had brave jawans gamely fighting the enemy as none had had the gumption to awaken Nehru and take his orders as the news was too big to handle otherwise.During the preceding days, everyone was tuned into Radio Peking to find out what was going on in our own country. 

The Chinese officially admit to 2,419 casualties (722 dead and 1,697 wounded),if it is a solace for India.The figure is quite stunning, given the situation in which each Indian position was asked to fight.According to Chinese records, at no stage had there been any action that pitted more than an Indian infantry company against at least four to five times the number of Chinese troops. 

1962 was a Nehru-Menon directed military disaster. President Radhakrishnan indicted the Government for its “credulity and negligence”. Nehru himself confessed, artfully using the plural, “We were getting out of touch with reality … and living in an artificial world of our own creation”.

He was reluctant to get rid of Krishna Menon, (making him, first, Minister for Defence Production and then Minister without Portfolio, in which capacity he brazenly carried on much as before). Public anger finally compelled the PM to drop him altogether or risk losing his own job.

Sam Maneckshaw

Nehru was broken and bewildered. His letter to John F Kennedy seeking US military assistance after the fall of Bomdila was abject and pathetic. He feared that unless the tide was stemmed the Chinese would overrun the entire Northeast. He said they were massing troops in the Chumbi Valley and he apprehended another “invasion” from there. If Chushul was overrun, there was nothing to stop the Chinese before Leh.

The IAF had not been used as India lacked air defence for its population centres. He therefore requested immediate air support by 12 squadrons of all-weather supersonic fighters with radar cover, all operated by US personnel. But US aircraft were not to intrude into Chinese air space.

On 21 November, Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Home Minister, paid a flying visit on a mission of inquiry and reassurance. He was followed the next day by Indira Gandhi.

Nehru had meanwhile broadcast to the nation, and more particularly to “the people of Assam “to whom his “heart went out” at this terrible hour of trial. He promised the struggle would continue and none should doubt its outcome. 

The administration returned to Bomdila only after a month. This it did under the Political Officer Maj K.C. Johorey just before Christmas.The people of NEFA had stood solidly with India and Johorey received a warm welcome.

Thapar had been removed and Gen J.N Chaudhuri appointed COAS. Kaul went into limbo. The Naga underground took no advantage of India’s plight. Pakistan had been urged by Iran and the US not to use India’s predicament to further its own cause and kept its word. But it developed a new relationship with China thereafter.

The US and the West had been sympathetic to India and its Ambassador, John Kenneth Galbraith, had a direct line to Kennedy.The US was also preoccupied with growing Sino-Soviet divide and the major Cuban missile crisis that boiled over in October 1962.

The COAS, Gen Choudhury ordered an internal inquiry into the debacle by Maj. Gen Henderson Brooks and Brigadier P.S Bhagat. The Henderson Brooks Report remains a top-secret classified document though its substance was leaked and published by Neville Maxwell who served as the London Times correspondent in India in the 1960s, became a Sinophile and wrote a critical book titled “India’s China War”. The Report brings out the political and military naiveté, muddle, contradictions and in-fighting that prevailed and failures of planning and command. There is no military secret to protect in the Henderson Brooks Report; only political and military ego and folly to hide. 

In 1968, Brigadier John Dalvi, the former commanding officer of the 7th Infantry Brigade that participated in the 1962 Sino-Indian War authored a book named Himalayan Blunder, where he gave his first hand accounts and perceptions of the causes for India's defeat in the war. He was critical of Lt General B.M. Kaul and attributed the loss in 1962 war partly to him. Excerpt from the book: "He managed to keep himself away from hardship and learning the nuances of a military commander as a junior officer and later in service, managed to grab important Army senior command appointments due to his "pull". His involvement with Jawaharlal Nehru later turned out to be a major reason for shameful loss and massacre of Indian troops at the hands of the Chinese".

In 1991, K. Satchidananda Murty wrote a biographical book about the second President of India, S  Radhakrishnan, named Radhakrishnan: His Life and Ideas. In the book, he quoted the former President as having expressed doubts over the capability of Lt General B.M. Kaul. Excerpt from the book: "The General Officer was well known in the Army and Political Circles to be a "personal favourite" of Jawaharlal Nehru since his junior officer days. He reportedly received a number of undue professional favours throughout his career due to this personal connection and he made full use of this opportunity with utter disregard to the Army organisation".

In the book The Unfought War of 1962: An Appraisal, by Raghav Sharan Sharma, he has mentioned that Lt General B.M. Kaul was a distant relation of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. As a result,Krishna Menon who was the then Defence Minister and Jawaharlal Nehru's close aide, appointed Lt General B.M. Kaul as Chief of General Staff, against the recommendation of the outgoing Chief of Army Staff, General K.S.Thimayya and in spite of the fact that he was an Army Supply Corps officer, with no prior combat experience and having never commanded a fighting unit earlier.

Lt General Kaul also authored a book named The Untold Story, where he gave his version of reasons for the loss in the 1962 war.

As long as Congress was in power,India did not learn the lesson that borders are more important than boundaries and continued to neglect the development of Arunachal and North Assam lest China roll down the hill again.But at present, given the prevailing global and regional strategic environment and India’scurrent military preparedness, the debacle of 1962 will not be repeated.

After a quarter century later,after he laid down the office,during the Question Answer session at the end of Field Marshal Sam Maneckshaw's lecture at the Staff College given on Armistice Day, a question was asked:In the 1962 war, what was your appointment, were you in a position to do something about the situation?

Maneckshaw:In the 1962 war, I was in disgrace.

"I was Commandant of this Institution.Krishna Menon, the Defence Minister, disliked me intensely. General Kaul, who was Chief of General Staff at the time, and the budding man for the next higher appointment, disliked me intensely. So, I was in disgrace at the Staff College. There were charges against me – I will enumerate some of them – all engineered by Krishna Menon.

"I do not know if you remember that in 1961 or 1960, General Thimayya was the Army Chief. He had fallen out with Krishna Menon and had sent his resignation. The Prime Minister, Nehru, persuaded General Thimayya to withdraw his resignation. The members of Parliament disliked Krishna Menon and they went hammer and tongs for the Prime Minister in Parliament.

"The Prime Minister made the statement, “I cannot understand why General Thimayya is saying that the Defence Ministry interferes with the working of the Army. Take the case of General Manekshaw. The Selection Board has approved his promotion to Lieutenant General, over the heads of 23 other officers. The Government has accepted that.”

"I was the Commandant of the Staff College. I had been approved for promotion to Lieutenant General. Instead of making me a Lieutenant General, Krishna Menon levied charges against me.

There were ten charges, I will enumerate only one or two of them – that I am more loyal to the Queen of England than to the President of India, that I am more British than Indian. That I have been alleged to have said that I will have no instructor in the Staff College whose wife looks like an ayah. These were the sort of charges against me.

"For eighteen months my promotion was held back. An enquiry was made. Three Lieutenant Generals, including an Army Commander, sat at the inquiry. I was exonerated on every charge. The file went up to the Prime Minister who sent it up to the Cabinet Secretary, who wrote on the file, ‘if anything happens to General Manekshaw, this case will go will down as the Dreyfus case.’

"So the file came back to the Prime Minister. He wrote on it, “Orders may now issue”, meaning I will now become a Lieutenant General. Instead of that, Ladies and Gentleman, I received a letter from the Adjutant General saying that the Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, has sent his severe displeasure to General Manekshaw, to be recorded.

"I had it in the office where the Commandant now sits. I sent that letter back to the Adjutant General saying what Krishna Menon could do with his displeasure – very vulgarly stated. It is still in my dossier.

"Then the Chinese came to my help. Krishna Menon was sacked, Kaul was sacked and Nehru sent for me. He said, “General, I have a vigorous enemy. I find that you are a vigorous General. Will you go and take over?” I said, “I have been waiting eighteen months for this opportunity,” and I went and took over.

"So, your question was 1962, and what part did I play -, none whatsoever, none whatsoever. I was here for eighteen months, persecuted, inquisitions against me but we survive …."

Another sordid story which began when Gen Thimayya was Chief and Nehru’s blue eyed Defence Minister – Krishna Menon began to under cut and humiliate the Chief in order to pave the way for the rise of the Kashmiri ASC Gen BM Kaul – a distant cousin of the PM:

The Story starts when the Defence Minister visits Maj Gen Sam Manekshaw who was GOC 26 Division and tries to enlist him against his own Chief – Gen Thimayya. Sam of course refuses point blank and thereby begins to dig his own grave.

This is the cause de terre for the enquiry which was initiated against Sam a year or so later when he was Commandant of the Staff College.

The principle witness against Sam in the enquiry against him was a close colleague and friend – then Colonel,later Brigadier – Kim Yadav. Kim was, indeed, an outstanding officer, who was for a while, ADC to Lord Louis Mountbatten.

Years later when Sam took over Western Command where Brig Kim Yadav was Commanding a Brigade, Sam heard some officers in the Mess, in hushed tones belittling Brig Yadav. Turning to them he says, “Gentlemen, Brig Kim Yadav professionally is head and shoulders above most of you – all he lacks is character”.

At the end of the 1971 war, Kim Yadav sent a telegram to Sam, ‘You seem to have won the war all by yourself – without any help from me! My Congratulations’.

POST SCRIPT:

What we saw was a Prime Minister commanded by Mountbatten,even in 1959.He suggested Thimayya for the supreme post;Thimayya briefed everything to the British High Commissioner.An army Chief and an army General leaked secrets.Thus the army was in disarray and Nehru was the last British PM of India!

_____________________________

Reference:

1.A Chequered Brilliance: The Many Lives of V.K. Krishna Menon/Jairam Ramesh

2.1962: The War That Wasn't/ Shiv Kunal Verma

3.Dalvi, Brig. J.P.,Himalayan blunder – the curtain raiser to the Sino-Indian war of 1962
4.Kaul, Lt. Gen. B.M., "The untold story" 
5.Maxwell, Neville, "India's China War" 

© Ramachandran