1962: THE WAR WITHIN CHINA AND NEHRU'S BLUNDER

Mao faced enemies within his party

In a 2019 article by Chaowu Dai, a distinguished professor at Yunnan University and director of the YNU Institute for Indian Studies in Kunming, China, admitted that from 1960 to October 1962, judging that India was unwilling to negotiate a solution, China “made preparations for the deployment of its military,” creating interlocking positions “for long-term armed coexistence on the border issue ultimately proceeding to the border conflict”1. 

This statement is nearest to the truth and India was not prepared for an attack. But the fact is that between 1960 to 1962, China was in a state of turmoil.

On September 8, 1962, Nehru left for London to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference. He returned on October 2, after visiting Paris, Lagos and Accra, and then left for Colombo on October 12, returning to New Delhi on October 16. Defence Minister V K Krishna Menon was in New York from September 17-30 for the UNGA session. On October 2, the Chief of General Staff, Lt Gen B M Kaul, an inefficient close relative of Nehru, was holidaying in Kashmir.

No country that is preparing for an attack would allow its Prime Minister or senior generals responsible for war planning to be away from its capital.

Nehru with Mao in Beijing, 1954

The immediate provocation was an avoidable statement of the Prime Minister to journalists on October 12 while leaving for Colombo that “he had instructed the Army to clear the Indian territory of Chinese intrusions and the date had been left to the army to decide.”

He was perhaps referring to a decision taken in the Defence Ministry to clear the recent limited intrusion in the Kemong Division of NEFA, now Arunachal Pradesh. People’s Daily, the Chinese communist party mouthpiece, taking advantage of Nehru’s remarks, said on October 14, “so it seems Nehru had made up his mind to attack China on an even bigger scale”.

The unfortunate statement of Nehru has been used by Chinese communists to fabricate the theory of “self-defence counter-attack”. At the same time, India cannot escape blame for not being serious about settling the border question, despite repeated Chinese pleas. Whatever the Indian stand, it had certain fissures that do not stand scrutiny.

Nehru, in explaining his reluctance to discuss the border question, had said in Rajya Sabha on December 8, 1959, that since we’re “sure of our borders, the question was why to invite discussions about a thing on which we had no doubt”.

Even this statement was opaque. The western border, which created the major dispute, was “undefined” in the Survey of India maps that India inherited in 1947, and which were later reprinted. Similarly, Nehru was not unaware that China in the past had never accepted the McMahon Line in the eastern sector, the outcome of the Simla Convention of 1914, and it was unlikely to accept it — and yet insisted this was non-negotiable.

In 1954, at the time of talks on Tibet, India had taken the stand that the border question would not be discussed. An opportunity to settle the border was allowed to slip. The Tibet Agreement signed on April 29, 1954, also called the Panchsheel Agreement, officially the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region of China and India, was signed by China and India in Peking. The preamble of the agreement stated the panchsheel, or the five principles of peaceful coexistence, that China proposed and India favoured.

The agreement reflected the adjustment of the previously existing trade relations between Tibet and India to the changed context of India's decolonisation and China's assertion of suzerainty over Tibet. Swedish author and China/India expert, Bertil Lintner (3) records that in the agreement, "Tibet was referred to, for the first time in history, as 'the Tibet Region of China."The agreement expired on June 6, 1962, as per the original term limit, in the midst of Sino-Indian border tensions.

Nehru ordered in 1954 July that a line should be drawn to demarcate the Ladakh-Aksai Chin border, which would not be open for discussion — ignoring that this was an international border, and required consultations and agreement of the other stakeholder.

Having changed the status of the border unilaterally, he created a vacuum by not establishing a check post, or even unfurling a flag.

The area was neglected to the extent that India was unaware that China had constructed a 120 km highway through it. In his letter of January 23, 1959, the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai had suggested talks since, as he said, historically no agreement on the boundary had ever been concluded, and the absence of formal delimitation created discrepancies which often led to “minor border incidents which are probably difficult to avoid”.

While these parleys were on, an event was waiting to happen, which would alter the Sino-Indian relationship forever.

Dalai Lama in India

On March 10, 1959, Chinese general Zhang Chenwu invited the Dalai Lama to a performance by a Chinese dance troupe. Soon after though, he received a message from the General asking him to appear without any soldiers or armed bodyguards. The peculiar request by the Chinese was expectedly met with a large amount of suspicion from the Tibetans who had in any case been suffering the oppression of the Chinese for over a decade.

 By the beginning of the 1950s, a large part of Tibet had been forcefully acquired by the Chinese. The next few years were witness to the Dalai Lama trying to evade a full-scale military takeover of Tibet by Chinese forces. The Chinese on the other hand had been trying their best to indoctrinate him into the Communist ideologies.

Given the backdrop of Chinese aggression in Tibet, the officials surrounding the Dalai Lama were quick to guess a sense of deceit in the Chinese invitation. As a cautionary measure, he was soon advised to escape from Tibet. On March 17, 1959, therefore, the Dalai Lama dressed up as a soldier and slipped out of the shelter of the monastery that he would never see again. Accompanying him were 20 of his officials. Barefoot, the spiritual leader made his way across the arduous Himalayan region, which included crossing the 500-yard-wide Brahmaputra river.

He finally reached India on March 30 and settled down at the Tawang monastery in Arunachal Pradesh. The following month he reached Mussoorie in present-day Uttarakhand, where he was later met by then Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to discuss the future of the Tibetan refugees who followed him.

Meanwhile, back in Tibet the Chinese imposed a curfew in Lhasa and close to 2000 people died in the ensuing battle between the local people and the Chinese forces. Close to 800 artillery shells were fired into the summer palace of the Dalai Lama. A day later, China announced the dissolution of the Tibetan governing body and a Tibetan autonomous region was established within the People’s Republic of China.

Nehru with Dalai Lama, 1959

Politically, the arrival of the Dalai Lama in India was a crucial moment in Indo-Chinese relations. For Nehru, maintaining cordial relations with China was always seen as a diplomatic necessity. According to historian Ramachandra Guha, “Nehru saw China at once as a peer, comrade and soul mate.”

However, over time arguments emerged between India and China, particularly around the issue of border creation post the departure of the British. In this atmosphere of antagonism, India’s grant of refuge to the Dalai Lama was an essential trigger that pushed both countries to the point of the war. The Sino-Indian war of 1962 which was eventually won by China, was one of the most critical products of the Dalai Lama’s escape to India.

Five days after Dalai Lama fled with the help of the CIA, (2) on March 22, 1959, Nehru noted that the sector from the trijunction of the Nepal, India, and Tibet boundary up to Ladakh (Ladakh-Aksai Chin sector) was traditional and known by custom, usage, the application of the principle of watershed and old revenue records and maps, etc. These facts are important inputs when negotiating an agreement, but by themselves could not constitute an agreement.

Despite suffering from doubts, Nehru insisted in Rajya Sabha on December 9, 1959, that India should hold its position, hoping that “lapse of time and events would confirm it, and by the time challenge came, we would be in a much stronger position to face it”. There was an opportunity to clear the doubts at the summit talks in April 1960, but that too was allowed to slip because India insisted on China accepting its maximalist position — not realising that in a dispute, both sides have to make compromises to come to a settlement.

Even after the 1960 talks, China tried to bring India to the negotiable table many times, but Nehru’s rigidity did not help. Yet he did accept in Parliament the undemarcated status of the border.

China continued to insist on the need for a well-defined demarcation of borders on scientific lines. Unfortunately, India remained in denial. The result was 1962.

The war within

An alternate narrative is offered by Bertil Lintner, on the 1962 war. He maintains that the Chinese offensive was not a reaction to India’s “forward policy” but a pre-meditated operation, ordered well before October 1962 by Chairman Mao Zedong to divert attention from the ongoing domestic power struggle and to teach India a lesson.

Lintner cites the considerable time required to build roads, forward-deploy 80,000 PLA troops and position logistics in mountainous terrain. Lintner also attributes the detailed knowledge of Indian terrain, shown by advancing PLA troops, to months of prior reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering by Tibetan-speaking PLA officers.

Ever since the end of its Civil War in 1949, China has been engaged in serial strife, domestic as well as external; invading neighbours, Korea, Tibet, Russia, Vietnam and India. The prelude to the Sino-Indian war saw Mao launch the tumultuous and destructive Great Leap Forward, which resulted in 25-30 million deaths by starvation and state violence. In the midst of ongoing domestic turmoil and devastation, Mao’s ruthless calculus perceived advantage in mounting a military campaign to deliver a sharp blow to India, both as a distraction from the ongoing power struggle, and to prove China’s superiority.

In the spring of 1949, Mao proclaimed that, while in the past the Chinese revolution had followed the unorthodox path of “encircling the cities from the countryside,” it would in the future take the orthodox road of the cities leading and guiding the countryside. In harmony with that view, he had agreed in 1950 with Vice Chairman Liu Shaoqi that collectivization would be possible only when China’s heavy industry had provided the necessary equipment for mechanization.

In a report of July 1955, Mao reversed that position, arguing that in China the social transformation could run ahead of the technical transformation. Deeply impressed by the achievements of certain cooperatives that claimed to have radically improved their material conditions without any outside assistance, he came to believe in the limitless capacity of the Chinese people, especially of the rural masses, to transform at will both nature and their own social relations when mobilized for revolutionary goals.

He denounced those in the leadership who did not share that vision as “old women with bound feet.” He made those criticisms before an ad hoc gathering of provincial and local party secretaries, thus creating a groundswell of enthusiasm for rapid collectivization such that all those in the leadership who had expressed doubts about Mao’s ideas were soon presented with a fait accompli. The tendency thus manifested to pursue his own ends outside the collective decision-making processes of the party was to continue and to be accentuated.

Chinese farmers welcome tractors, 1958

Even before Stalin’s successor, Nikita S. Khrushchev, had given his secret speech (February 1956) denouncing his predecessor’s crimes, Mao and his colleagues had been discussing measures for improving the morale of the intellectuals in order to secure their willing participation in building a new China. At the end of April, Mao proclaimed the policy of “letting a hundred flowers bloom”—that is, the freedom to express many diverse ideas—designed to prevent the development in China of a repressive political climate analogous to that in the Soviet Union under Stalin.

In the face of the disorders called forth by de-Stalinization in Poland and Hungary, Mao did not retreat but rather pressed boldly forward with that policy, against the advice of many of his senior colleagues, in the belief that the contradictions that still existed in Chinese society were mainly nonantagonistic. When the resulting “great blooming and contending” got out of hand and called into question the axiom of party rule, Mao savagely turned against the educated elite, which he felt had betrayed his confidence. Henceforth he would rely primarily on the creativity of the rank and file as the agent of modernization. As for the specialists, if they were not yet sufficiently “red,” he would remould them by sending them to work in the countryside.

Chaos after the Great Leap Forward

It was against that background that Mao, during the winter of 1957–58, worked out the policies that were to characterize the Great Leap Forward, formally launched in May 1958. While his economic strategy was by no means so one-sided and simplistic as was commonly believed in the 1960s and ’70s and although he still proclaimed industrialization and a “technical revolution” as his goals, Mao displayed continuing anxiety regarding the corrupting influence of the fruits of technical progress and an acute nostalgia for the perceived purity and egalitarianism that had marked the moral and political world of the Jinggang Mountains and Yan’an eras.

Thus it was logical that he should endorse and promote the establishment of “people’s communes” as part of the Great Leap strategy. As a result, the peasants, who had been organized into cooperatives in 1955–56 and then into fully socialist collectives in 1956–57, found their world turned upside down once again in 1958. Neither the resources nor the administrative experience necessary to operate such enormous new social units of several thousand households was in fact available, and, not surprisingly, the consequences of those changes were chaos and economic disaster.

In retrospect, it is evident that Mao had in fact responded to the tensions in the Party by promoting free speech and criticism under the Hundred Flowers Campaign. This was also a ploy to allow critics of the regime, primarily intellectuals but also low-ranking members of the party critical of the agricultural policies, to identify themselves.

By the completion of the first five Year Economic Plan in 1957, Mao had come to doubt that the path to socialism that had been taken by the Soviet Union was appropriate for China. He was critical of Khrushchev's reversal of Stalinist policies and alarmed by the uprisings that had taken place in East Germany, Poland and Hungary, and the perception that the USSR was seeking "peaceful coexistence" with the Western powers. Mao had become convinced that China should follow its own path to communism. China's isolation from most of the rest of the world, along with the Korean War, had accelerated Mao's attacks on his perceived domestic enemies. It led him to accelerate his designs to develop an economy where the regime would get the maximum benefit from rural taxation.

Thus the Great Leap Forward (Second Five Year Plan) of China was an economic and social campaign led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from 1958 to 1962. Local officials were fearful of Anti-Rightist Campaigns and they competed to fulfil or over-fulfil quotas which were based on Mao's exaggerated claims, collecting non-existent "surpluses" and leaving farmers to starve to death. Higher officials did not dare to report the economic disaster which was being caused by these policies, and national officials, blaming bad weather for the decline in food output, took little or no action. Millions of people died in China during the Great Leap, with estimates ranging from 15 to 55 million, making the Great Chinese Famine the largest or second-largest famine in human history.

The public canteen of a commune

Around 6 to 8% of those who died during the Great Leap Forward were tortured to death or summarily killed.

The major changes which occurred in the lives of rural Chinese people included the incremental introduction of mandatory agricultural collectivization. Private farming was prohibited, and those people who engaged in it were persecuted and labelled counter-revolutionaries. Restrictions on rural people were enforced with public struggle sessions and social pressure, and forced labour was also exacted on people. Rural industrialization, while officially a priority of the campaign, saw "its development ... aborted by the mistakes of the Great Leap Forward". The Great Leap was one of two periods between 1953 and 1976 in which China's economy shrank.

The Great Chinese Famine

The disorganization and waste created by the Great Leap, compounded by natural disasters and by the termination of Soviet economic aid, led to widespread famine in China.

The Great Chinese Famine was a period between 1959 and 1961 in the history of China, characterized by widespread famine. Some scholars have also included the years 1958 or 1962. It is widely regarded as the deadliest famine and one of the greatest man-made disasters in human history, with an estimated death toll due to starvation that ranges in the tens of millions (15 to 55 million). The most stricken provinces were Anhui (18% dead), Chongqing (15%), Sichuan (13%), Guizhou (11%) and Hunan (8%).

The major contributing factors to the famine were the policies of the Great Leap Forward (1958 to 1962) and people's communes, launched by Mao, such as inefficient distribution of food within the nation's planned economy; requiring the use of poor agricultural techniques; the Four Pests Campaign that reduced sparrow populations, which disrupted the ecosystem; over-reporting of grain production; and ordering millions of farmers to switch to iron and steel production.

Policy changes affecting how farming was organized coincided with droughts and floods. As a result, year-over-year grain production fell dramatically in China. The harvest was down by 15% in 1959 compared to 1958, and by 1960, it was at 70% of its 1958 level. Specifically, according to China's governmental data, crop production decreased from 200 million tons (or 400 billion jin) in 1958 to 170 million tons (or 340 billion jin) in 1959, and to 143.5 million tons (or 287 billion jin) in 1960.

There are widespread oral reports, though little official documentation, of human cannibalism being practised in various forms as a result of the famine. To survive, people had to resort to every possible means, from eating earth and poisons to stealing and killing and even eating human flesh. Due to the scale of the famine, some have speculated that the resulting cannibalism could be described as "on a scale unprecedented in the history of the 20th century."

Yang Jisheng's seminal book, Tombstone: The Chinese Famine 1958-1962 has described instances of cannibalism during that period.

In Henan alone, there were at least 20 cases of people eating human flesh. An 18-year-old girl drowned her five-year-old cousin and ate him. The boy's 14-year -old elder sister was also driven by hunger and ate her brother's flesh. In Anhui, there were 63 cases of cannibalism between 1959 and 1960. A couple strangled their eight-year-old son, and then cooked and ate him. In the same province, a man dug-up a corpse, ate some of it, and sold a kilo as pork.

Starving children in Shanghai during the famine

Famine along the mid-Yangzi was averted in 1956 through the timely allocation of food aid, but in 1957 the Party's response was to increase the proportion of the harvest collected by the state to insure against further disasters. Moderates within the Party, including Zhou Enlai, argued for a reversal of collectivization on the grounds that claiming the bulk of the harvest for the state had made the people's food security depends upon the constant, efficient, and transparent functioning of the government.

By the winter of 1958–59, Mao himself had come to recognize that some adjustments were necessary, including decentralization of ownership to the constituent elements of the communes and a scaling down of the unrealistically high production targets in both industry and agriculture. He insisted, however, that in broad outline his new Chinese road to socialism, including the concept of the communes and the belief that China, though “poor and blank,” could leap ahead of other countries, was basically sound.

In 1959, Mao had to delegate day-to-day leadership to pragmatic moderates like Chinese President Liu Shaoqi and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping.

Mao retires, Shaoqi becomes head of state

As the horrifying (and almost entirely preventable) results of the Great Leap Forward became obvious, leaders began to discuss how to bring relief to those areas hardest hit by famine. 

in the midst of this chaos, on 25 March 1959, the expanded Politburo of the CCP met in Shanghai. Though the issue that topped the agenda was the Great Leap Forward, the Tibetan issue came up because the Tibetan revolt has just been crushed and the Dalai Lama had fled to India. Both Deng and Liu Shaoqi were advocating more realistic economic policies. But Deng was a hardliner when it came to dealing with Tibet. 

Despite the consensus on Tibet, Mao was still in trouble and the Shanghai meeting endorsed his retirement from his post as the Chairman of the People's Republic or the head of state. That post was given to Shaoqi. Mao stayed on as Chairman of the Party and continued manipulation.

The well-educated Zhou Enlai had actually been one of the first to initiate a campaign against Mao, as early as 1956. But Zhou, feeling insecurity, undertook 'self-criticism' in March 1958, for opposing Mao. He confessed in front of the Party commission: "I take the main responsibility for submitting the report opposing rash advance (of Mao), in effect dashing cold water on the upsurge among the masses...at the time I lacked perception, and it was only later that I gradually came to understand that this was a directional error on the issue of socialist construction."

With this opportunism,  a humiliated Zhou rescued himself from later purges by Mao. He demonstrated opportunism again when the CCP convened a meeting of its Politburo and a plenum of the CC at Lushan, a mountain resort in Jiangxi, in July 1959.

Peng Dehuai's missive to Mao

After a personal fact-finding trip through many of the regions most affected by the campaign, defence minister Peng Dehuai learned of the severe suffering and widespread starvation. Peng Dehuai, as a veteran of the Long March, hero of the Korean War, and longtime friend of Mao, felt compelled to broach the issue and to prevent any further deterioration of the situation. Peng presented his findings after the Central Committee had confirmed the “success" of the movement during the Lushan Meeting. 

The Lushan Conference was a meeting of the top leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held between July and August 1959. The CCP Politburo met in an "expanded session" between July 2 and August 1, followed by the 8th Plenum of the CCP Eighth Central Committee from August 2 – 16. The major topic of discussion was the Great Leap Forward.

Although many of the more moderate leaders had reservations about the new policy, the only senior leader to speak out openly was Marshal Peng Dehuai. He denounced the excesses of the Great Leap and the economic losses they had caused.

While the Conference was on, Peng wrote a letter to Mao on July 13 and 14, 1959, in which he did not seek to grandstand and went to great lengths to make his comments constructive. He did, however, point out the failures of the movement in a frank and forthright manner, while most of his colleagues chose to remain silent. As a result of Mao Zedong's failure to address the agricultural mistakes, the country experienced three years of famine, killing over 30 million people.

In the letter, he said that " there is a growing tendency towards boasting and exaggeration on a fairly extensive scale" and "the exaggeration trend has become so common in various areas and departments that reports of unbelievable miracles have appeared in newspapers and magazines to bring a great loss of prestige to the Party." (4)

He further said: "Petty-bourgeois fanaticism which makes us vulnerable to "left" errors. In the Great Leap Forward of 1958,1, like many other comrades, was misled by the achievements of the Great Leap Forward and the zeal of the mass movement. As a result, some "Left" tendencies developed in our heads. We were thinking of entering a communist society in one stride, and the idea of trying to be the first to do this gained an upper hand in our minds for a time. So we banished from our minds the mass line and the working style of seeking truth from facts, which had been cultivated by the Party for a long time."

Peng Dehuai,1934-1935

With Peng's letter in hand, Mao set out to test the loyalty of each person in attendance at the Lushan Conference. And, to accomplish this, he personally circulated Peng’s letter of opinion to everyone present. By gauging their reactions, he could see who was steadfastly in support of Mao’s leadership, and who was not. Sensing what Mao was up to, Peng urgently requested to have all copies of his letter retrieved, claiming that it was a private missive intended for Mao’s eyes only. The request was denied.

Next, to prevent potential defectors from conspiring behind his back in small group meetings, Mao convened a full plenary session of the Lushan Conference. Speaking to the assembled party leaders on July 23, he addressed head-on the question of rising dissatisfaction with the Great Leap.

Mao confronts Peng

By turns humble, rambling, introspective, egotistical, sarcastic, and downright intimidating, Mao confronted his chief critic, Peng Dehuai:

Now that you’ve said so much, [Mao began,] let me say something … People say we’ve become isolated from the masses, but the masses still support us … [Some comrades] are wavering. They [pay lip service], affirming that the Great Leap and the people’s communes are good and correct. But we must see on whose side they [really] stand. I would advise them not to waver at this crucial point in time. [Their] brinkmanship is rather dangerous. If you don’t believe me, [just] wait and see what happens.

Having said this, Mao paused for effect. Casting his gaze in the general direction of a group of top PLA generals seated in the conference hall, he laid down the gauntlet: “If the People’s Liberation Army won’t follow me,” he said, “then I will go down to the countryside, reorganize the Red Army guerrillas, and organize other People’s Liberation Army.”

Pausing yet again for effect, he continued: “But I think the Army will follow me.” At that point, several Chinese generals stood up and shouted their pledges of allegiance to Mao.

When Mao finished speaking, Peng Dehuai’s famously short temper erupted. He accused Mao of despotism, comparing him to Stalin in his later years; and he warned that “if the Chinese peasants were not so patient, we’d have another Hungary [on our hands].”

The gloves were off, and Mao now responded in kind, accusing Peng of being a rightist, of sabotaging the people’s democratic dictatorship, and of attempting to organize an opposition faction within the Communist Party.

Things turned even uglier when Mao attempted to cut short the defence minister’s retort, at which point Peng angrily reminded the chairman of a quarrel they had had two decades earlier, during the anti-Japanese War. The defence minister had overplayed his hand. Several key leaders who had initially been inclined to endorse his criticism of the Great Leap, including such senior figures as Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, and Marshal Zhu De, now backed off, intimidated by the chairman’s display of full-bore combativeness. Mao had won.

Peng is sacked

In the days that followed, no one ventured to speak out in Peng Dehuai’s defence. At Mao’s initiative, Peng and his small inner circle of supporters, including the PLA chief of staff/  Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Zhu De,  deputy foreign minister Zhang Wentian, and Mao’s own longtime personal secretary Tian Jiaying, were officially charged with having formed an ‘anti-party clique’, and they were subjected to varying degrees of punishment. Peng himself was stripped of his post as defence minister and placed under house arrest in Beijing.

Zhang Wentian, a party veteran, a Politburo member, and General Secretary of the Party during 1935-1943, was outspoken in his criticism of Mao. Peng, Zhang and other critics were branded 'rightists' and 'counter-revolutionaries' and were purged after the Lushan conference. Zhang was accused of having 'illicit relations with a foreign country, which meant the Soviet Union, and buckets of sewage water were poured over his head as he was ordered to confess his mistakes. 

The lessons of Peng Dehuai’s abject defeat at the hands of Mao were not lost on anyone in the party’s leadership circle: First, it was clearly safer to err on the side of leftism than on the side of rightism. And second, despite Mao’s open invitation to his colleagues to speak out freely and openly, challenging the chairman could be extremely hazardous to one’s political health. As a senior Chinese diplomat put it, “After Lushan, the whole party shut up. We were all afraid to speak out.”

Mao denounced Peng (who came from a poor peasant family) and his supporters as "bourgeois", and launched a nationwide campaign against "rightist opportunism". Peng was replaced by Lin Biao, who began a systematic purge of Peng's supporters from the military. He was immediately removed from all party and state posts and placed in detention until his death during the Cultural Revolution.

From that time, Mao regarded any criticism of his policies as nothing less than a crime of lèse-majesté, meriting exemplary punishment. The old marshal Zhu De, founder of PLA, had tried to protect Peng at Lushan by criticising him only mildly. That was enough for Mao, and Zhu was dismissed from his post as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission.

 The CCP studied the damage which was done at conferences it held in 1960 and 1962, especially at the "Seven Thousand Cadres Conference". Mao did not retreat from his policies; instead, he blamed problems on bad implementation and "rightists" who opposed him.

Though few spoke up at Lushan in support of Peng, a considerable number of the top leaders sympathized with him in private. Almost immediately, in 1960, Mao began building an alternative power base in the People’s Liberation Army, which the new defence minister, Lin Biao, had set out to turn into a “great school of Mao Zedong Thought.” At about the same time, Mao began to denounce the emergence, not only in the Soviet Union but also in China itself, of “new bourgeois elements” among the privileged strata of the state and party bureaucracy and the technical and artistic elite. Under those conditions, he concluded, a “protracted, complex, and sometimes even violent class struggle” would continue during the whole socialist stage.

Peng was brought to Beijing in chains, in 1966

Thus the effects on the upper levels of government and the Party in response to the disaster were complex, with Mao purging Peng Dehuai,  temporary promoting Lin Biao, Liu Shaoqi, and Deng Xiaoping, and Mao himself losing some power and prestige following the Great Leap Forward, which led him to launch the Cultural Revolution in 1966.

Peng lived in virtual obscurity until 1965, when the reformers Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping supported Peng's limited return to government, developing military industries in Southwest China. In 1966, following the advent of the Cultural Revolution, Peng was arrested by Red Guards. From 1966–1970, radical factions within the Communist Party, led by Lin Biao and Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, singled out Peng for national persecution, and Peng was publicly humiliated in numerous large-scale struggle sessions and subjected to physical and psychological torture in organized efforts to force Peng to confess his "crimes" against Mao and the Communist Party.

In 1970, Peng was formally tried and sentenced to life imprisonment, and he died in prison in 1974. After Mao died in 1976, Peng's old ally, Deng Xiaoping, emerged as China's paramount leader. Deng led an effort to formally rehabilitate people who had been unjustly persecuted during the Cultural Revolution, and Peng was one of the first leaders to be posthumously rehabilitated, in 1978.

Mao's Spy

One big reason that Mao was able to intimidate his critics so consistently and so effectively—aside from his famous mercurial temper and iron will—was his chief of internal security, Kang Sheng. Ever since the mid-1930s, Kang Sheng had been entrusted by Mao with the task of compiling secret dossiers on all party leaders at or above the provincial level.

Knowing that such career-damaging ‘black materials’ existed and that Mao would not hesitate to use them to destroy his colleagues was a huge deterrent to would-be critics. In this respect, Kang Sheng was Mao’s chief enabler, in much the same way that Lavrentiy Beria had been Joseph Stalin’s principal spy. Without such loyal and utterly ruthless security chiefs, both Stalin and Mao might not have enjoyed such apparent invincibility.

Kang Sheng was a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) official, best known for having overseen the work of the CCP's internal security and intelligence apparatus during the early 1940s and again at the height of the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s and early 1970s. A member of the CCP from the early 1920s, he spent time in Moscow during the early 1930s, where he learned the methods of the NKVD.

In 1936, Kang established the Office for the Elimination of Counterrevolutionaries and worked closely with the Soviet secret police, the NKVD, in purging perhaps hundreds of Chinese in Moscow.

After returning to China in 1937, Kang switched his allegiance to Mao and became a close associate of Mao during the Anti-Japanese War, the Chinese Civil War and after. Kang was a valuable catch for Mao as he strove to consolidate the power he had won at the Zunyi Conference in January 1935. Kang could betray all the secrets of Wang Ming, Mao's political rival in the Party, and his supporters.

At Yan'an, Kang was close to Jiang Qing, who may have been Kang's mistress when he visited Shandong in 1931. (5) In Yan'an, Jiang became the lover of Mao, who later married her.

Kang Sheng was the mastermind behind the "pain and friction" that underlay the Rectification process. He used a classic Soviet technique of accusing loyal party members of being Nationalist spies. Once they had confessed under torture, their confessions could then set off an avalanche of accusations and arrests. At the same time, Mao was not keen to have a single man in such a position of power. Accordingly, following the CCP's Seventh Congress in April 1945, Kang was replaced as head of both the Social Affairs Department and the Military Intelligence Department.

Kang with Mao

After his fall from the security posts, in December 1946 Kang was assigned by Mao Zedong, Zhu De and Liu Shaoqi to review the Party's land reform project in Longdong, Gansu Province. In the name of social justice, he encouraged the peasants to settle scores by killing landlords and rich peasants.

Early in 1948, he was appointed deputy chief of the Party's East China Bureau, under Rao Shushi. Some commentators speculate that the private humiliation of being placed under a former subordinate may be one reason why Kang "fell ill" and largely disappeared from view until after Rao's fall in 1954. Kang seems to have displayed, manic-depressive psychosis and temporal lobe epilepsy.

The challenges that Kang faced during the early months of 1956 underscored the dangers he would have risked by continuing his retreat. As soon as he reappeared, Kang encountered serious problems that caused his position in the hierarchy to fluctuate dramatically. After the purge of Gao Gang and Rao Shushi in 1954, he ranked sixth, below Chairman Mao, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and Chen Yun. But in February 1956, just weeks after his return to public life, he was listed below Peng Zhen. 

By the end of April, he was reported in tenth place, even below Luo Fu, the only member of the 28 Bolsheviks who still held a Politburo seat. Yet on May Day of 1956, Kang was suddenly back in sixth place. Kang suffered a severe reversal of fortune at the Central Committee plenum that followed the first session of the CCP's Eighth Congress when he was demoted to alternate, nonvoting member of the Politburo.

Mao's own position was weakening, as evidenced by the decision of the CCP's Eighth Congress to delete the phrase "guided by the thought of Mao Zedong" from the new Party constitution and by re-establishing the role of General Secretary, abolished in 1937. Kang's emergence during the cultural revolution as one of the most important Maoist stalwarts suggests that it is not unlikely that at the 8th Congress Mao saved Kang from even greater humiliation.

Thereafter, Kang remained at or near the pinnacle of power until his death in 1975. After the death of Mao and the subsequent arrest of the Gang of Four, Kang was accused of sharing responsibility with the Gang for the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and in 1980 he was expelled posthumously from the CCP.

To divert the mass attention from the strife in China and the threat to his leadership inside the Party, Mao planned the attack on India.

The attack on India

The open split with the Soviet Union, though it can be traced to Mao’s resentment at Khrushchev’s failure to consult him before launching de-Stalinization—resulted, above all, from the Soviet reaction to the Great Leap policies. Khrushchev regarded Mao’s claims for the communes as ideologically presumptuous, and he heaped ridicule on them; he underlined his displeasure by withdrawing Soviet technical assistance in 1960, leaving many large industrial plants unfinished. Khrushchev also tried to put pressure on China in its dealings with Taiwan and India and in other foreign policy issues. Mao forgot neither the affront to his and China’s dignity nor the economic damage.

As for class struggle in China itself, Mao’s fear that revisionism might appear there was heightened by the policies pursued in the early 1960s to deal with the economic consequences of the Great Leap Forward. The response to the famine by Liu Shaoqi (who had succeeded Mao as chairman of the People’s Republic in 1959), Deng Xiaoping, and the economic planners was to make use of material incentives and to strengthen the role of individual households in agricultural production. At first, Mao agreed reluctantly that such steps were necessary, but during the first half of 1962, he came increasingly to perceive the methods used to promote recovery as implying the repudiation of the whole thrust of the Great Leap strategy. It was as a direct response to that challenge that at the 10th Plenary Session of the Central Committee in September 1962 he issued the call, “Never forget the class struggle!”

During the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference in early 1962, Liu Shaoqi, then President of China, formally attributed 30% of the famine to natural disasters and 70% to man-made errors.

Dr Li Zhisui, Mao's personal physician, wrote in Mao's biography later that Mao's support within the Party was waning even after Lushan. In January 1962, when Mao convened another expanded CC to discuss the continuing disaster, his support within the Party was at its lowest. At the meeting, President Shaoqi openly blamed the famine on 'man-made disasters.' Shaoqi wanted to bring back the leaders who had been purged, which made Mao furious.

A failed Mao, to win over the masses, show heroism, and regain control inside the Party, waged an attack on India, with his crony Lin Biao.

Before launching the Himalayan military intervention, Beijing sought and received reassurances from both superpowers. The US indicated that it had no immediate plans to either “unleash Taiwan” or to escalate the Indo-China conflict. Moscow, too, sent word that it would remain neutral in case of a Sino-Indian conflict.

In India’s remote and inaccessible Aksai Chin, it was months before New Delhi realised, in 1955, that China was building a road linking Xinjiang and Tibet. In 1961, to overcome the impression that India had not adequately pursued its territorial rights, PM Nehru adopted what came to be known as the “forward policy,” moving its outposts forward and closer to Chinese forces.

Nehru with Sikh Regiment, 1962

The Chinese attack on India took place in two stages; a brief preliminary offensive on October 20, 1962, followed by a massive assault in mid-November, reaching the Himalayan foothills. Indian soldiers fought gallantly in NEFA (now Arunachal) as well as in Ladakh, often to the last man and last bullet, but in vain. The rout lasted all the way up to November 20 when the Chinese declared a unilateral ceasefire and withdrew 20 km north of the LAC.

During the next three years Mao waged such a struggle, primarily through the Socialist Education Movement in the countryside, and it was over the guidelines for that campaign that the major political battles were fought within the Chinese leadership. At the end of 1964, when Liu Shaoqi refused to accept Mao’s demand to direct the main thrust of class struggle against “capitalist roaders” in the party, Mao decided that “Liu had to go.”

Liu's conflict with Mao

Liu Shaoqi had spoken very strongly in favour of the Great Leap Forward at the Eighth CCP National Congress in May 1958. At this Congress Liu stood together with Deng Xiaoping and Peng Zhen in support of Mao's policies against those who were more critical, such as Chen Yun and Zhou Enlai.

As a result, Liu gained influence within the party. In April 1959, he succeeded Mao as Chairman of the People's Republic of China (Chinese President). However, Liu began to voice concern about the outcomes of the Great Leap in the August 1959 Lushan Plenum. In order to correct the mistakes of the Great Leap Forward, Liu and Deng led economic reforms that bolstered their prestige among the party apparatus and the national populace. The economic policies of Deng and Liu were notable for being more moderate than Mao's radical ideas.

Liu was publicly acknowledged as Mao's chosen successor in 1961; However, by 1962, when Mao waged the war against India, Liu's opposition to Mao's policies had led Mao to mistrust him. After Mao succeeded in restoring his prestige during the 1960s, Liu's eventual downfall became "inevitable". Liu's position as the second-most powerful leader of the CCP contributed to Mao's rivalry with him at least as much as Liu's political beliefs or factional allegiances in the 1960s, especially during and after the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference (1962 January 11-February 7), indicating that Liu's later persecution was the result of a power struggle that went beyond the goals and well-being of either China or the Party.

In a conference at the seaside town resort of Beidaihe in August 1962, Mao blamed the disastrous consequences of his Great Leap Forward on Liu, Zhou, Deng, Chen Yun and other moderates.

According to Roderick MacFarquhar in his book, Origins of the Cultural Revolution (p303), a major build-up of war material and an increase in the number of Chinese troops along the border could be noticed only a few days after the Beidaihe conference was concluded on 27 August.

Liu was labelled as a "traitor" and "the biggest capitalist roader in the Party"; he was displaced as Party Deputy Chairman by Lin Biao in July 1966. By 1967, Liu and his wife Wang Guangmei were placed under house arrest in Beijing. Liu was removed from all his positions and expelled from the Party in October 1968. At Congress, Liu was denounced as a traitor and an enemy agent. Zhou Enlai read the Party verdict that Liu was "a criminal traitor, enemy agent and scab in the service of the imperialists, modern revisionists and the Kuomintang reactionaries". Liu's conditions did not improve after he was denounced in the Ninth Party Congress in 1969, and he died soon afterwards.

Liu with Indira Gandhi, 1954

By 1966, few senior leaders in China questioned the need for widespread reform to combat the growing problems of corruption and bureaucratisation within the Party and the government. With the goal of reforming the government to be more efficient and true to the Communist ideal, Liu himself chaired the enlarged Politburo meeting that officially began the Cultural Revolution. However, Liu and his political allies quickly lost control of the Cultural Revolution soon after it was called, when Mao used the movement to progressively monopolize political power and destroy his perceived enemies.

The Cultural Revolution declared in 1966, was overtly pro-Maoist, and gave Mao the power and influence to purge the Party of his political enemies at the highest levels of government. Along with closing China's schools and universities, and Mao's exhortations to young Chinese to randomly destroy old buildings, temples, and art, and to attack their teachers, school administrators, party leaders, and parents, the Cultural Revolution also increased Mao's prestige so much that entire villages adopted the practice of offering prayers to Mao before every meal.

Mao established himself as a demigod accountable to no one, purging any that he suspected of opposing him and directing the masses and Red Guards "to destroy virtually all state and party institutions". After the Cultural Revolution was announced, most of the senior members of the CCP who had voiced any hesitation in following Mao's direction, including Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, were removed from their posts almost immediately and, with their families, subjected to mass criticism and humiliation.

Liu and Deng, along with many others, were denounced as "capitalist roaders". Liu was labelled as a "traitor" and "the biggest capitalist roader in the Party"; he was displaced as Party Deputy Chairman by Lin Biao in July 1966. By 1967, Liu and his wife Wang Guangmei were placed under house arrest in Beijing. Liu was removed from all his positions and expelled from the Party in October 1968. After his arrest, Liu disappeared from public view.

He was denied medicine for his diabetes, and for pneumonia, which developed after his arrest. Liu was eventually given treatment only when Jiang Qing, the actress wife of Mao, feared he would die; she desired that Liu be kept alive to serve as a "living target" during the Ninth Party Congress in 1969.

At Congress, Liu was denounced as a traitor and an enemy agent. Zhou Enlai read the Party verdict that Liu was "a criminal traitor, enemy agent and scab in the service of the imperialists, modern revisionists and the Kuomintang reactionaries". Liu's conditions did not improve after he was denounced in Congress, and he died soon afterwards, on November 12, aged 70.

After the launch of Reforms and Opening Up, the Chinese Communist Party officially stated in June 1981 that the famine was mainly due to the mistakes of the Great Leap Forward as well as the Anti-Rightist Campaign, in addition to some natural disasters and the Sino-Soviet split.

______________________

1. China’s Strategy for Sino-Indian Boundary Disputes, 1950-1962, Asian Perspective, Johns Hopkins University Press

2. The CIA's Secret War in Tibet, Kenneth Conboy, James Morrison, University Press of Kansas, 2002

3. China's India War, Bertil Lintner, Oxford University Press, 2018

4. Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal, Peng Dehuai, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1984

5. Faligot, Roger; Kauffer, Remi (1989). The Chinese Secret Service. Translated by Christine Donougher

© Ramachandran 

HOW NEHRU AND MENON LET DOWN INDIA IN 1962

Menon Humiliated the Army Chief Thimayya

The Sino-Indian Treaty on Relations between India and the Tibet Region of China was signed in 1954. India gave up its rights in Tibet without seeking a quid pro quo. The Panch Sheel was enunciated,which Jawaharlal Nehru presumed presupposed inviolate boundaries in an era of Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai.

The young Dalai Lama ( then 26) came to India in 1956 to participate in the 2500th anniversary celebrations commemorating the Enlightenment of the Buddha but was reluctant to return home as he felt China had reneged from its promise of Tibetan autonomy. Chou En-lai visited India later that year and sought Nehru’s good offices to persuade the Dalai Lama to return to Lhasa on the assurance of implementation of the 17 Point Agreement by China in good faith.

Visiting China in 1954, Nehru drew Chou En-lai’s attention to the new political map of India which defined the McMahon Line and the J&K Johnson Line as firm borders (and not in dotted lines or vague colour wash as previously depicted) and expressed concern over corresponding Chinese maps that he found erroneous. Chou En-lai replied that the Chinese had not yet found time to correct its old maps but that this would be done “when the time is ripe”. Nehru assumed this implied tacit Chinese acceptance of India’s map alignments but referred to the same matter once again during Chou’s 1956 visit to India.

The Aksai Chin road had been constructed by China by 1956-57 but only came to notice in 1958 when somebody saw it depicted on a small map in a Chinese magazine. India protested. The very first note in the Sino-Indian White Papers, published later, declared Aksai Chin to be “indisputably” Indian territory ” and, thereafter, incredibly lamented the fact that Chinese personnel had wilfully trespassed into that area “without proper visas”.The misguided Nehru was even at that time prepared to be flexible and negotiate a peaceful settlement or an appropriate adjustment. Parliament and the public were, however, kept in the dark.

Menon and Nehru

Nehru had begun to reassess his position.The late G. Parthasarathi met Nehru on the evening of 18 March 1958, after all concerned had briefed him prior to his departure for Peking as the new Indian Ambassador to China. GP recorded what Nehru said:

“So G.P. what has the Foreign Office told you? Hindi-Chini bhai bhai? Don’t you believe it! I don’t trust the Chinese one bit. They are a deceitful opinionated, arrogant and hegemonistic lot. Eternal vigilance should be your watch word. You should send all your Ttelegrams only to me – not to the Foreign Office. Also, do not mention a word of this instruction of mine to Krishna ( Menon). He, you and I all share a common world view and ideological approach. However, Krishna believes – erroneously – that no Communist country can have bad relations with any Non-Aligned country like ours”.

Chinese incursions and incidents at Longju and Khizemane in Arunachal and the Kongka Pass, Galwan and Chip Chap Valleys in Ladakh followed through 1959. The Times of India broke many of these early stories.Vague whispers of “some trouble” further east were heard.On the way to Chushul, the air strip was still open,and beyond to the Pangong Lake unimpeded.

The Khampa rebellion in Tibet had erupted and the Dalai Lama fled to India in 1959 via Tawang where he received an emotional welcome. The Government of India granted him asylum along with his entourage and over 100,000 refugees that followed and he took up residence with his government-in-exile in Dharamsala. These events  disturbed the Chinese and marked a turning point in Sino-Indian relations. Their suspicions about India’s intentions were not improved by Delhi’s connivance in facilitating CIA-trained Tibetan refugee guerrillas to operate in Tibet and further permitting an American listening facility to be planted on the heights of Nanda Devi to monitor Chinese signals in Tibet.

China had by now commenced its westward cartographic-cum-military creep in Ladakh and southward creep in Arunachal.

The highly respected Chief of Army Staff, Gen.K.S. Thimayya began to envisage a new defence posture vis-à-vis China in terms of plans, training, logistics and equipment.Krishna Menon, aided by B.N. Mullick, the IB Chief , who also was close to Nehru, disagreed with this threat perception and insisted that attention should remain focussed on Pakistan and the “anti-Imperialist forces”. Growing interference by Krishna Menon, now Defence Minister, in Army postings and promotions and strategic perspectives so frustrated Thimayya that he tendered his resignation to Nehru in 1959. Fearing a major crisis, the PM persuaded Thimayya to withdraw his resignation, which he unfortunately did at the cost of his authority. Nothing changed. Mullick and Menon sowed in Nehru’s mind the notion that a powerful Chief might stage a coup (as Ayub had done). This myth was for long a factor in Government’s aversion to the idea of appointing a Chief of Defence Staff.

A coup had taken place the previous year in October 1958 in neighbouring Pakistan, and there was loose talk in the cocktail party circuit of whether India’s turn would be next. A naturally paranoid defence minister would have found all this sinister, even though the Times of India of 4 January 1959 carried this report:

No Possibility of Military ‘Coup’ in India

Ruling out the possibility of a military ‘coup’ in India, Mr. V.K. Krishna Menon, Defence Minister, said here today that ‘whosoever attempted such a thing would come to grief . . .’ Mr. Menon said:

"We have a strong parliamentary system of Government. Our soldiers are well educated and disciplined. They do not meddle in politics.’ ‘In fact’, Mr. Menon added, ‘it is silly to think in terms of a military dictatorship’. ‘The people’, he said, ‘were conscious of their democratic rights and the prevailing social conditions widely varied from what led to military regime in other countries . . ."

Mountbatten had been pressing both Nehru and Krishna Menon to appoint a chief of defence staff (CDS) who would have overarching authority over the army, navy and air force, and had been suggesting Thimayya’s name for this post. Krishna Menon resented this lobbying and, in any case, was dead set against the idea of a CDS, thinking that it would give too much importance in policy to a single military man.

It was with pain and anguish  Gen Thimayya described to other senior officers, the relations of the Army HQs with the Defense Ministry; mainly his with the Defense Minister, VK Krishna Menon.

No wonder the Indian Army got the thrashing of its life from the Chinese, just three years later in 1962. And within two years of that Nehru died a broken and ravaged man. Here is how the story of General Thimayya’s resignation:

Menon called Thimayya and told him that he had no business to meet the Prime Minister without his specific approval. Thimayya reiterated that the Prime Minister desired to know about the preparedness and the state of morale of the Army and he had told him nothing that he had, over the period of 18 months or so, not discussed with the Minister.

Menon remained furious and said: “No, General. It’s downright disloyalty and amounts to impropriety.”

To this, Thimayya replied,: “I make no allegations. You can call the other Chiefs too. They will say the same that they and I have continuously said — that the Services are being neglected and that their morale is low. These are the facts that we have told you earlier and I told the Prime Minister now. I am reiterating that by speaking candidly I and other Chiefs are being loyal to you, the Government and to the Country. That’s what loyalty means to me.”

After another outburst from Menon, Thimayya saw no further point in carrying on the conversation. Deeply hurt at the Minister’s remarks, he got up and repeated: “I have never been disloyal to anyone, least of all to you, my country or the government.”

Menon shouted at the top of his voice. “You are disloyal to me and I have no place for disloyal generals”. 

After Thimaya  left, Menon met Nehru, who asked him not to rock the boat. He assured him that he would once again get the chiefs’ willing co-operation, provided Menon showed patience.

It was late when Thimayya reached home and told his wife, Nina to be ready to pack up and then murmured, “It’s time to pack up honorably.” He also talked to the other Chiefs, Air Chief Marshal Mukherjee and Admiral Katari and told them he was seriously contemplating putting in his papers the next day. Both repeated their vow to ‘follow him.

General Thimayya

Thimayya drafted his resignation letter the following morning and showed it to Mukherjee and Katari, both of whom confirmed their willingness to follow suit. “My conscience says wait” was Nina’ s advice.

Thimaya called Major General S.P.P. Thorat, his preferred successor, who advised the same. So was the suggestion of Bogey Sen, his CGS and Wadalia, his Deputy Chief. General Cariappa who was in Delhi asked him to meet the prime minister again before he ‘bunged in’ his letter.

That night, Thimayya thought and re-thought about throwing away a fine career, the great honor the country had bestowed upon him and the trust his officers and men had reposed in him. It was one of the saddest nights of his life. In the morning Thimaya sent his letter to Nehru..

Nehru called Thimayya and put his arm around his shoulder and asked him why he hadn’t met him earlier, rather than sending in his resignation. “Please withdraw it straight away,” ordered a visibly annoyed Prime Minister. “I will see you again at 7 pm with your letter withdrawing your resignation. In the meanwhile, I am keeping your letter with me.” He then asked him to return at 7 pm.

Katari had informed Mukherjee, who was by now in London, that Thimayya had submitted his resignation and he was following suit. The period between 2.30 pm and 7 pm was used by Nehru to control the damage which the resignation of the chiefs would cause to the government, the services’ morale, and result in the joy of the enemy.

Nehru rang up Katari and told him that he had called Thimayya and he was withdrawing his resignation and he should not entertain any such proposal. (A similar message went to Mukherjee through the High Commission.) He told him that Thimayya would meet him again in the evening and he should meet him at 9.30 pm.

By the time Thimaya arrived at the Teen Murti residence of the prime minister at 7 pm through a carefully orchestrated game play, Nehru had distanced the other chiefs from Thimayya by talking them out of it. Menon too was asked to keep a draft of his resignation handy. An emergency meeting of the Cabinet Committee was also called.

When they met, Nehru began his effort to win over Timayya.Thimayya said that he had not changed his mind and instead urged the prime minister to accept his resignation. In his defense, he argued: “That’s the only honorable course left to me and the other chiefs. When professional advice and recommendations are flouted at the drop of a hat, the chief loses his place and importance.”

Nehru said: “We have sufficient problems. And at this moment of crisis, one should not do anything to encourage opponents and the enemy. Shouldn’t it be so, Timmy?"

Thimayya explained that it was indeed a “moment of crisis” and it was his loyalty to him and his sense of patriotism to the country that had moved him to sacrifice his job. He repeated that Menon as defense minister had “made it impossible” for him and the other chiefs to work as head of the services, and unless Menon was moved out of defense, there could be little progress. But he understood that as this obviously could not be agreed to by the prime minister, he — and the other chiefs — should step aside, and, therefore the submission of his resignation.

Nehru admitted that Menon was a “difficult man”, but he was simply “brilliant” and was doing service to defence which no one earlier had done. Thimaya agreed, but suggested that his methods of “man-management” were “outrageous” and his brilliance was that of an “Oxford professor of philosophy” rather than of a man dealing with the country’s defense forces which have to be prepared and motivated to fight enemies.

Finally, he told his prime minister: “With the present state of the army, I can hardly assure success. We are not prepared. All my efforts — as also of others — have failed for the past 24 to 30 months to make the armed forces a viable defense force. So let someone else do the job – I request my resignation be kindly accepted.”

Nehru then pleaded with Thimayya: “Timmy, I ask you to withdraw this resignation. I, as your elder and not necessarily your Prime Minister, am requesting you to do s o. I promise to restore dignity to you and the other Chief’s Offices. We have to fight an enemy. For my sake, withdraw it.”

At 9.30 pm Katari met Nehru who told him that they were “ganging up” against Menon and that “Thimayya had withdrawn his resignation” — both factually wrong. Katari, then decided to call off handing his letter of resignation without even checking with Thimayya.

Enormous damage was done to the Chiefs’ solid standing.

On the morning of 1 September, the Capital awoke alarmed to the disturbing disclosures in the Statesman about Thimayyas’ resignation (which had, by then, been withdrawn). J N Chaudhuri,a top army officer,who was the daily's confidential military commentator, had passed on the information.Chaudhuri would become Chief of the Army in November 1962.Chaudhuri would later admit in his autobiography to being the military correspondent of the Statesman from 1951 for a decade and confess that his ‘anonymity was very well kept’.

There was also considerable applause when the prime minister assured the House — and through it, the country — that “under our practice, the civil authority is, and must remain supreme” (while it should, however, pay due heed to expert advice). There was also applause when he referred to the army’s “fine mettle” and “excellent morale.”

It was (daughter) Mireille who wept bitterly at the public humiliation of her father in Parliament (where she sat alongside Indira Gandhi) by Pandit Nehru; tears welled up in her eyes. When she recalled the scene to her father, the tears returned.

She spoke of these things to her father on the telephone at Secunderabad where he had gone for the forth coming inauguration of the Joint Land Warfare School. “Daddy, you have been let down. Mummy was right in asking you not to withdraw your letter.”

Thimayya said nothing.

On his return to Delhi, he showed her the office copy of his letter of resignation that contained the gist of what had transpired between him and Nehru – besides the appeals from the prime minister to withdraw his letter.

“You’ll now on defend your father, I hope,” he said. 

“Always passionately, Daddy,” replied Mireille.

“If these are trivial, then I know of no other important issues,” he told Nina, who was furious at the withdrawal and asked him to “re-resign” without a second thought, and expose the duo.

He told her that he had accepted the advice and the assurances of his Prime Minister and had withdrawn his resignation.“For, in a democracy, a resignation is the only constitutional safeguard to a service chief against incompetent, unscrupulous or ambitious politicians” .

A month after the Thimayya resignation episode, the UK high commissioner in India, Malcolm Macdonald, met General Thimayya on 6 October 1959 and sent back a report of their long conversation, which was largely on the India–China border question. Towards the end, the topic of the minister of defence came up and Macdonald wrote:

"General Thimayya said one of the great difficulties in all this business had been Mr. Krishna Menon’s zeal in representing the Pakistanis as the true enemies of India. Mr. Menon played up and often publicized as extremely unfriendly every small frontier trouble between the Pakistanis and Indians, invariably blaming the Pakistanis. The General did not know why the Minister did this. Perhaps it was because Mr. Menon wished to strengthen the case he had made (with popular effect for himself in India) against Pakistan over the Kashmir issue. Anyway, whatever the reason, the Minister of Defence insisted that India’s armed forces should be disposed on the assumption that an attack on India would be launched from Pakistan."

That Thimayya opened up to Macdonald was highly unusual as, after all, the latter was the UK high commissioner, and the top army man was telling him every detail of what he had said to his Prime Minister and defence minister.

On his father's side, Thimayya belonged to the Kodendera clan of Kodagu to which India's first commander-in-chief General Cariappa also belonged (his uncle in fact).

General Thimayya had recommended Gen Thorat to succeed him as Gen Thorat had carried out a thorough recce and submitted a plan to Timmy in case of a war with China.

This was that since NO Roads had been made in the forward areas despite the urgings of Sardar Vallabhai Patel since 1950 and others thereafter, a classic Defensive Battle should be fought at the existing road heads so as to blunt the Chinese Offensive as then that would be from an extended advance over nebulous foot paths.

This recommendation was shelved and Gen Thapar was made Chief as a stop gap till Gen Kaul took over.

B M Kaul

President Ayub Khan of Pakistan had on a brief stopover meeting with Nehru in Delhi en route to Dhaka in 1959 had proposed “joint defence”. Joint defence against whom, was Nehru’s scornful and unthinking retort. Nehru was not unconscious of a potential threat from the north as he had from the early 1950s repeatedly told Parliament that the Himalayan rampart was India’s defence and defence line. He had somewhat grandiloquently and tactlessly proclaimed that though Nepal was indeed a sovereign nation, when it came to India’s security, India’s defence lay along the Kingdom’s northern border, Nepal’s independence notwithstanding! He had been remarkably lax in preparing to defend that not-quite-so-impenetrable a rampart  or even countenance his own military from doing so.

Almost a decade later, Himalayan border road construction commenced under the Border Roads Organisation and forward positions were established. This Forward Policy, though opposed by Lt Gen.Daulat Singh, GOC-in-C Western Command, was pushed by Krishna Menon,de facto Foreign Minister, and equally by B.N Mullick, who played a determining role in these events, being present in all inner councils.

Many of the 43 new posts established in Ladakh were penny packets with little capability and support or military significance. The objective appeared more political, in fulfilment of an utterly fatuous slogan Nehru kept uttering in Parliament and elsewhere, that “not an inch of territory” would be left undefended though he had earlier played down the Aksai Chin incursion as located in a cold, unpopulated, elevated desert “where not a blade of grass grows”. In August Nehru announced that Indian forces had regained 2500 square miles of the 12,000 square miles occupied by the Chinese in Ladakh.

Backseat driving of defence policy continued to the end of Thimayya’s tenure when General P.N.Thapar was appointed COAS in preference to Thimayya’s choice of Lt. Gen S.P.P Thorat, Eastern Army Commander. Thorat had produced a paper in the prevailing circumstances advocating that while the Himalayan heights might be prepared as a trip-wire defence, NEFA should essentially be defended lower down at its waistwhich, among other things, would ease the Indian Army’s logistical and acclimatisation problems and correspondingly aggravate those of the Chinese. The Thorat plan, “The China Threat and How to Meet It”, got short shrift.

The Goa operation at the end of 1960 witnessed two strange events. The new Chief of General Staff (CGS), Lt. Gen. Brij Mohan Kaul marched alongside one of the columns of the 17th Division under Gen Kunhiraman Palat Candeth,( a Keralite like Menon), that was tasked to enter Goa. Thereafter he and, separately, the Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, declared “war” or the commencement of operations at two different times: one at midnight and the other at first light the next morning. In any other situation such flamboyant showmanship could have been disastrous.Goa was a cake walk and evoked the mistaken impression among gifted amateurs in high places that an unprepared Indian Army could take on China.

Kaul’s promotion to the rank of Lt. Gen and then to key post of CGS had stirred controversy,since he was a relative of Nehru. He was politically well connected and had held staff and PR appointments but was without command experience. The top brass was divided and the air thick with intrigue and suspicion. Kaul had inquiries made into the conduct of senior colleagues like Thorat, S.D Verma and then Maj.Gen. Sam Manekshaw, Commandant of the Staff College in Wellington.

Even as the exchange of Sino-Indian notes continued, Nehru on 12  October 1962 said he had ordered the Indian Army “to throw the Chinese out”, something casually revealed to the media at Palam airport before departing on a visit to Colombo.

A new 4 Corps was created on 8 October 1962 with headquarters at Tezpur to reinforce the defence of the Northeast. Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh was named GOC but was soon moved to take over 33 Corps at Siliguri and then moved again to the Western Command. Kaul took charge of 4 Corps but appeared to have assumed a superior jurisdiction because of his direct political line to Delhi. Command controversies were further compounded as at times it seemed that both everybody and nobody was in charge. Thapar himself and Gen L.P. Sen,  at Eastern Command, also went to recce and reorder defence plans along the Bomdila-Se La sector. At the political level and at the External Affairs Ministry the adage was “Panditji knows best”.

Kaul was here, there and everywhere, exposing himself in high altitudes without acclimatisation.He fell ill and was evacuated to Delhi on 18 October only to return five days later.

Following Nehru’s “throw them out” order, and against saner military advice and an assessment of ground realities, a Brigade under John Dalvi was positioned on the Namka Chu River below the Thagla Ridge that the Chinese claimed lay even beyond the McMohan Line. It was a self -made trap. It was but to do or die. The Brigade retreated in disorder after a gallant action, while the Chinese rolled down to Tawang which they reached on 25 October.

The Economist parodied Rudyard Kipling. A text of a pithy editorial titled “Plain Tales from the Hills” read, “When the fog cleared, The Chinese were there”.

A new defence line was hurriedly established at Se La. Nehru was by now convinced that the Chinese were determined to sweep down to the plains. The national mood was one despondency, anger, foreboding. The Times of India editor, N.J.Nanporia, who sadly just passed away a few weeks ago, got it right.

In an edit page article he argued that the Chinese favoured negotiation and a peaceful settlement, not invasion, and India must talk. At worst the Chinese would teach India a lesson and go back. Critics scoffed at Nanporia. A week or 10 days later, in response to his critics, he
reprinted the very same article down to the last comma and full-stop. Events proved him absolutely right.

On 24 October, Chou En-lai proposed a 20 kilometre withdrawal by either side. Three days later Nehru sought the enlargement of this buffer to 40-60 km. On 4 November, Chou offered to accept the McMahon Line provided India accepted the Macdonald Line in Ladakh approximating the Chinese claim line (giving up the more northerly Johnson Line favoured by Delhi).

The Army arranged for the press to visit the NEFA front. On 15-17 November 15-17 all drove up to Se La (15,000 feet) and down to Dirang Dzong in the valley beyond before the climb to Bomdila.

Reporters saw Jawans in cottons and perhaps a light sweater and canvas shoes were manhandling ancient 25-pounders into position at various vantage points.They had seen and heard Brij Mohan Kaul’s theatrics and bravado at 4 Corps Headquarters a day earlier and were shocked to see the reality: ill-equipped, unprepared but cheerful officers and men digging in to hold back the enemy under the command of a very gallant officer, Brig Hoshiar Singh.

Dalai Lama,Nehru,Zhou En Lai

The press had barely returned to Tezpur on 17 November,when they learnt that the Chinese had mounted an attack on Se La and outflanked it as well. 

Even as battle was joined, Kaul, disappeared from Tezpur to be with his men, throwing the chain of command into disarray. The saving grace was the valiant action fought at Walong in the Lohit Valley. Much gallantry was also displayed in Ladakh against heavy odds.

The use of the air force had been considered. Some thought that the IAF had the edge as its aircraft would be operating with full loads from low altitude air strips in Assam unlike the Chinese operating from the Tibetan plateau at base altitudes of 11,000-12,000 feet.The decision was to avoid use of offensive air power to prevent escalation.

On 18 November, word came that the Chinese had enveloped Se La, which
finally fell without much of a fight in view of conflicting orders. A day later the enemy had broken through to Foothills along the Kameng axis. Confusion reigned supreme. Kaul or somebody ordered the 4th Corps to pull back to Gauwahati on 19 November and, as military convoys streamed west, somebody else ordered that Tezpur and the North Bank be evacuated.

A “scorched earth” policy was ordered by somebody else again and the Nunmati refinery was all but blown up. The DM deserted his post. Rana KDN Singh, was directed to take charge of a tottering administration. He supervised the Joint Steamer Companies, mostly manned by East Pakistan lascars, as they ferried a frightened and abandoned civil population to the South Bank. The other modes of exodus were by bus and truck, car, cart, cycle and on foot. The last ferry crossing was made at 6 pm. Those who remained or reached the jetty late, melted into the tea gardens and forest.

The Indian Press had ingloriously departed the previous day, preferring safety to real news coverage, – as happened again in Kashmir in 1990, when at least women journalists subsequently redeemed the profession. Alongwith the two Indians remained in Tezpur, wandering around like lost souls, were some 10-15 patients who had been released from the local mental hospital.

Tezpur was a ghost town. The State Bank had burned its currency chest and a few charred notes kept blowing in the wind as curious mental patients kept prodding the dying embers. Some stray dogs and alley cats were the only other companions.

Around midnight, a transistor  crackled to life as Peking Radio announced a unilateral ceasefire and pull back to the pre-October “line of actual control”, provided the Indian Army did not move forward. 

Next morning, all the world carried the news, but AIR still had brave jawans gamely fighting the enemy as none had had the gumption to awaken Nehru and take his orders as the news was too big to handle otherwise.During the preceding days, everyone was tuned into Radio Peking to find out what was going on in our own country. 

The Chinese officially admit to 2,419 casualties (722 dead and 1,697 wounded),if it is a solace for India.The figure is quite stunning, given the situation in which each Indian position was asked to fight.According to Chinese records, at no stage had there been any action that pitted more than an Indian infantry company against at least four to five times the number of Chinese troops. 

1962 was a Nehru-Menon directed military disaster. President Radhakrishnan indicted the Government for its “credulity and negligence”. Nehru himself confessed, artfully using the plural, “We were getting out of touch with reality … and living in an artificial world of our own creation”.

He was reluctant to get rid of Krishna Menon, (making him, first, Minister for Defence Production and then Minister without Portfolio, in which capacity he brazenly carried on much as before). Public anger finally compelled the PM to drop him altogether or risk losing his own job.

Sam Maneckshaw

Nehru was broken and bewildered. His letter to John F Kennedy seeking US military assistance after the fall of Bomdila was abject and pathetic. He feared that unless the tide was stemmed the Chinese would overrun the entire Northeast. He said they were massing troops in the Chumbi Valley and he apprehended another “invasion” from there. If Chushul was overrun, there was nothing to stop the Chinese before Leh.

The IAF had not been used as India lacked air defence for its population centres. He therefore requested immediate air support by 12 squadrons of all-weather supersonic fighters with radar cover, all operated by US personnel. But US aircraft were not to intrude into Chinese air space.

On 21 November, Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Home Minister, paid a flying visit on a mission of inquiry and reassurance. He was followed the next day by Indira Gandhi.

Nehru had meanwhile broadcast to the nation, and more particularly to “the people of Assam “to whom his “heart went out” at this terrible hour of trial. He promised the struggle would continue and none should doubt its outcome. 

The administration returned to Bomdila only after a month. This it did under the Political Officer Maj K.C. Johorey just before Christmas.The people of NEFA had stood solidly with India and Johorey received a warm welcome.

Thapar had been removed and Gen J.N Chaudhuri appointed COAS. Kaul went into limbo. The Naga underground took no advantage of India’s plight. Pakistan had been urged by Iran and the US not to use India’s predicament to further its own cause and kept its word. But it developed a new relationship with China thereafter.

The US and the West had been sympathetic to India and its Ambassador, John Kenneth Galbraith, had a direct line to Kennedy.The US was also preoccupied with growing Sino-Soviet divide and the major Cuban missile crisis that boiled over in October 1962.

The COAS, Gen Choudhury ordered an internal inquiry into the debacle by Maj. Gen Henderson Brooks and Brigadier P.S Bhagat. The Henderson Brooks Report remains a top-secret classified document though its substance was leaked and published by Neville Maxwell who served as the London Times correspondent in India in the 1960s, became a Sinophile and wrote a critical book titled “India’s China War”. The Report brings out the political and military naiveté, muddle, contradictions and in-fighting that prevailed and failures of planning and command. There is no military secret to protect in the Henderson Brooks Report; only political and military ego and folly to hide. 

In 1968, Brigadier John Dalvi, the former commanding officer of the 7th Infantry Brigade that participated in the 1962 Sino-Indian War authored a book named Himalayan Blunder, where he gave his first hand accounts and perceptions of the causes for India's defeat in the war. He was critical of Lt General B.M. Kaul and attributed the loss in 1962 war partly to him. Excerpt from the book: "He managed to keep himself away from hardship and learning the nuances of a military commander as a junior officer and later in service, managed to grab important Army senior command appointments due to his "pull". His involvement with Jawaharlal Nehru later turned out to be a major reason for shameful loss and massacre of Indian troops at the hands of the Chinese".

In 1991, K. Satchidananda Murty wrote a biographical book about the second President of India, S  Radhakrishnan, named Radhakrishnan: His Life and Ideas. In the book, he quoted the former President as having expressed doubts over the capability of Lt General B.M. Kaul. Excerpt from the book: "The General Officer was well known in the Army and Political Circles to be a "personal favourite" of Jawaharlal Nehru since his junior officer days. He reportedly received a number of undue professional favours throughout his career due to this personal connection and he made full use of this opportunity with utter disregard to the Army organisation".

In the book The Unfought War of 1962: An Appraisal, by Raghav Sharan Sharma, he has mentioned that Lt General B.M. Kaul was a distant relation of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. As a result,Krishna Menon who was the then Defence Minister and Jawaharlal Nehru's close aide, appointed Lt General B.M. Kaul as Chief of General Staff, against the recommendation of the outgoing Chief of Army Staff, General K.S.Thimayya and in spite of the fact that he was an Army Supply Corps officer, with no prior combat experience and having never commanded a fighting unit earlier.

Lt General Kaul also authored a book named The Untold Story, where he gave his version of reasons for the loss in the 1962 war.

As long as Congress was in power,India did not learn the lesson that borders are more important than boundaries and continued to neglect the development of Arunachal and North Assam lest China roll down the hill again.But at present, given the prevailing global and regional strategic environment and India’scurrent military preparedness, the debacle of 1962 will not be repeated.

After a quarter century later,after he laid down the office,during the Question Answer session at the end of Field Marshal Sam Maneckshaw's lecture at the Staff College given on Armistice Day, a question was asked:In the 1962 war, what was your appointment, were you in a position to do something about the situation?

Maneckshaw:In the 1962 war, I was in disgrace.

"I was Commandant of this Institution.Krishna Menon, the Defence Minister, disliked me intensely. General Kaul, who was Chief of General Staff at the time, and the budding man for the next higher appointment, disliked me intensely. So, I was in disgrace at the Staff College. There were charges against me – I will enumerate some of them – all engineered by Krishna Menon.

"I do not know if you remember that in 1961 or 1960, General Thimayya was the Army Chief. He had fallen out with Krishna Menon and had sent his resignation. The Prime Minister, Nehru, persuaded General Thimayya to withdraw his resignation. The members of Parliament disliked Krishna Menon and they went hammer and tongs for the Prime Minister in Parliament.

"The Prime Minister made the statement, “I cannot understand why General Thimayya is saying that the Defence Ministry interferes with the working of the Army. Take the case of General Manekshaw. The Selection Board has approved his promotion to Lieutenant General, over the heads of 23 other officers. The Government has accepted that.”

"I was the Commandant of the Staff College. I had been approved for promotion to Lieutenant General. Instead of making me a Lieutenant General, Krishna Menon levied charges against me.

There were ten charges, I will enumerate only one or two of them – that I am more loyal to the Queen of England than to the President of India, that I am more British than Indian. That I have been alleged to have said that I will have no instructor in the Staff College whose wife looks like an ayah. These were the sort of charges against me.

"For eighteen months my promotion was held back. An enquiry was made. Three Lieutenant Generals, including an Army Commander, sat at the inquiry. I was exonerated on every charge. The file went up to the Prime Minister who sent it up to the Cabinet Secretary, who wrote on the file, ‘if anything happens to General Manekshaw, this case will go will down as the Dreyfus case.’

"So the file came back to the Prime Minister. He wrote on it, “Orders may now issue”, meaning I will now become a Lieutenant General. Instead of that, Ladies and Gentleman, I received a letter from the Adjutant General saying that the Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, has sent his severe displeasure to General Manekshaw, to be recorded.

"I had it in the office where the Commandant now sits. I sent that letter back to the Adjutant General saying what Krishna Menon could do with his displeasure – very vulgarly stated. It is still in my dossier.

"Then the Chinese came to my help. Krishna Menon was sacked, Kaul was sacked and Nehru sent for me. He said, “General, I have a vigorous enemy. I find that you are a vigorous General. Will you go and take over?” I said, “I have been waiting eighteen months for this opportunity,” and I went and took over.

"So, your question was 1962, and what part did I play -, none whatsoever, none whatsoever. I was here for eighteen months, persecuted, inquisitions against me but we survive …."

Another sordid story which began when Gen Thimayya was Chief and Nehru’s blue eyed Defence Minister – Krishna Menon began to under cut and humiliate the Chief in order to pave the way for the rise of the Kashmiri ASC Gen BM Kaul – a distant cousin of the PM:

The Story starts when the Defence Minister visits Maj Gen Sam Manekshaw who was GOC 26 Division and tries to enlist him against his own Chief – Gen Thimayya. Sam of course refuses point blank and thereby begins to dig his own grave.

This is the cause de terre for the enquiry which was initiated against Sam a year or so later when he was Commandant of the Staff College.

The principle witness against Sam in the enquiry against him was a close colleague and friend – then Colonel,later Brigadier – Kim Yadav. Kim was, indeed, an outstanding officer, who was for a while, ADC to Lord Louis Mountbatten.

Years later when Sam took over Western Command where Brig Kim Yadav was Commanding a Brigade, Sam heard some officers in the Mess, in hushed tones belittling Brig Yadav. Turning to them he says, “Gentlemen, Brig Kim Yadav professionally is head and shoulders above most of you – all he lacks is character”.

At the end of the 1971 war, Kim Yadav sent a telegram to Sam, ‘You seem to have won the war all by yourself – without any help from me! My Congratulations’.

POST SCRIPT:

What we saw was a Prime Minister commanded by Mountbatten,even in 1959.He suggested Thimayya for the supreme post;Thimayya briefed everything to the British High Commissioner.An army Chief and an army General leaked secrets.Thus the army was in disarray and Nehru was the last British PM of India!

_____________________________

Reference:

1.A Chequered Brilliance: The Many Lives of V.K. Krishna Menon/Jairam Ramesh

2.1962: The War That Wasn't/ Shiv Kunal Verma

3.Dalvi, Brig. J.P.,Himalayan blunder – the curtain raiser to the Sino-Indian war of 1962
4.Kaul, Lt. Gen. B.M., "The untold story" 
5.Maxwell, Neville, "India's China War" 

© Ramachandran